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BEYOND THE NEW
FEDERALISM-REVENUE SHARING IN
PERSPECTIVE
GEORGE D. BROWN*
In 1972 Congress added General Revenue Sharing to the list
of federal grant-in-aid programs for states and localities. Pres-
ident Nixon had recommended Revenue Sharing, as apart of
his "New Federalism," because it would foster local autonomy
by minimizing federal restrictions on the grants. When Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing was renewed in 1976, Congress made
no changes in the formula, leading some commentators to
minimize the significance of those changes which were made.
Professor Brown argues that the 1976 renewal amendments
to the Revenue Sharing Act are an example of "interventionist
federalism," a new form of federal influence over state and
local governments. The federal government, while not specify-
ing how Revenue Sharing funds must be spent, places on
recipients strict conditions meant to promote such policies as
non-discrimination and open access to state and local
decision-making bodies. Thus the 1976 amendments, while
enhancing local autonomy in spending decisions, enable the
federal government to affect state administration in a poten-
tially broader way than in the past.
Introduction
Prompted by decisions such as National League of Cities v.
Usery1 and Younger v. Harris,2 lawyers are accustomed to
viewing the courts as the forum in which the great controver-
sies of federalism are settled. In fact, however, it is
Congress-not the courts-which makes most major decisions
*Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Harvard, A.B., 1961; LL.B., 1965.
1 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Usery's resurrection of the Tenth Amendment has generated
numerous analyses of the decision itself, as well as a renewal of interest in federalism
generally. See, e.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1977).
2 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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concerning the allocation of power within the federal system;
and, increasingly, Congress exercises this choice when it
shapes the contours of federal grant-in-aid programs. Federal
grants to units of state and local government now total ap-
proximately $85 billion annually.3 At the heart of every
grant-in-aid debate is the issue of which level of government
will have the power to determine how the funds are spent.
Enactment of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of
19724 (Revenue Sharing) marked a dramatic turning point in
the American federal system.5 By guaranteeing state and
local governments $6 billion annually, the legislation consti-
tuted the largest domestic aid program ever enacted by Con-
gress. At the same time this legislation contained few strings
to control the recipient's expenditure of the funds. Former
President Richard Nixon adopted Revenue Sharing as the
cornerstone of his "New Federalism" policy. The objective of
this policy was to return to state and local governments cer-
tain powers which had allegedly drifted away from these units
over the years and accrued to the federal bureaucracy.6
But Revenue Sharing today is different from what it was in
1972. January 1, 1977, marked the effective date of a set of
amendments to the original Act7 which may be indicative of
future grant-in-aid changes. Given the outpouring of studies
on the 1972 Revenue Sharing Act, the lack of scholarly inter-
est in the renewal amendments is surprising. The only major
study to date-Revenue Sharing: The Second Round, by the
Brookings Institution-describes the renewed Revenue Shar-
ing program as reflecting predominantly the "Ford Adminis-
tration's status quo position ...... Brookings concludes that
3 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Special
Analyses Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1979 175 (1978).
4 State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Revenue Sharing Act].
5 Nathan,Federalism and the Shifting Nature ofFiscalRelations, 419 ANNALS 120,
121 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Nathan].
6 See President's Message to the Congress Proposing a Program for the Sharing of
Federal Revenues With the States, 5 WEEKLY COIxP. OF PRES. Doc. 1143 (Aug. 13,
1969).
7 State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, 90
Stat. 2341 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Revenue Sharing Amendment].
8 R. NATHAN AND C. ADAMS, JR., REVENUE SHARING: THE SECOND ROUND 23 (1977
(Brookings Institution) [hereinafter cited as SECOND ROUND].
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the amendments simply deal with "process issues .... ,,9 In
fact, however, the renewal amendments represent both a sig-
nificant change in Revenue Sharing itself and the possible
emergence of a new approach to federal-state power relation-
ships.
This article analyzes the renewal amendments, and par-
ticularly their implementation by the Office of Revenue Shar-
ing (ORS), as an example of what might be called "interven-
tionist federalism." As used here, the term refers to the na-
tional government's use of grants to gain broad leverage over
the organization and behavior of state and local governments,
while allowing these units substantial discretion in the actual
use of grant funds. This concept of federal-state relations differs
both from Nixon's New Federalism and from the system of
categorical grants which preceded it. It offers Congress the
opportunity to institute changes far beyond those it can
achieve through direct "regulation" of state and local govern-
ments. Thus, for example, new federal programs such as the
proposed "National Urban Policy" are likely to involve inter-
ventionist uses of the grant system in order to further national
goals for urban areas and preserve a degree of sub-national
autonomy.10
The article also focuses on Congress' increased use of citizen
recourse to federal administrative and judicial processes as a
means of enforcing grantee compliance with program strings
and of redistributing political power at sub-national levels.
This congressional policy of opening up federal forums to
those who may have been excluded from state and local de-
cisionmaking comes, paradoxically, at the height of a judicial
view of federalism which takes precisely the opposite ap-
proach. In focusing on interventionist federalism and the
use of federal forums to enforce Revenue Sharing strings, the
article examines both the future of federal grant programs
9 Id. at 166.
10 The Carter Administration has studied one proposal for its national urban
policy, which would increase allotments of Revenue Sharing funds to states that aid
their depressed municipalities. These increases would be funded by cutting allotments
to states which do not provide such aid. See, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
11 See Note, Stone v. Powell and the New Federalism: A Challenge to Congress, 14
HARV. J. LEGis. 152, 157-61 (1976).
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and the broader issues concerning the role of federal institu-
tions as overseers of state and local governments.
I. REVENUE SHARING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID
SYSTEM
Despite the enactment of Revenue Sharing, other grant-
in-aid programs have remained fixtures of the federal gov-
ernment's efforts to transfer funds to state and local govern-
ments. In order to understand fully the impact of Revenue
Sharing and its 1976 amendments on federal-state relations, it
is important first to consider grant-in-aid programs and their
theoretical underpinnings.
A. The Grant Programs-A System?
A basic text on state and local finance describes grants as
tcan essential mechanism for federalism. 1 2 Although esti-
mates of the number of grants have varied widely, it appears
that there are between 400 and 500 different programs of fi-
nancial assistance from the national government to state and
local units.13 In Fiscal Year 1979, federal grants will total ap-
proximately $85 billion, continuing a trend dating from the
mid-1960's during which the increase in grant funds far out-
stripped the overall rate of growth of the federal budget. 14
Programs range in size from several billion dollars annually
to the hundred thousand dollar level. Given the extraordinary
variety of grant programs, it is questionable whether one can
speak of a grant-in-aid "system" at all.15
12 J. MAXWELL & J. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 63 (3d.
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MAXWELL & ARONSON].
13 Stanfield, Will New Federalism Live On? 9 NAT'L J. 1242 (Aug. 6, 1977); Fiscal
Relations in the American Federal System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1975) (statement of David B.
Walker) [hereinafter cited as Walker].
14 See U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President,
Special Analyses Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1979 175
(1978). From FY 1967. to FY 1977 the average annual increase in grants was 16.2
percent, while total federal outlays grew by 9.8 percent annually.
15 See M. DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS 3-8 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as DERTHICK].
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An examination of the substantial body of academic litera-
ture on grant programs reveals that four distinct lines of
analysis have developed which purport to serve as expla-
nations of, and justifications for, grant programs. 16 It may
well be that no single explanation offers convincing proof that
the multiplicity of programs does constitute a system. How-
ever, the recurrence of certain interrelated themes, both in
the academic literature and in the political debates, suggests
that Congress' $85 million expenditure for the grants is based
on more than a series of ad hoc decisions.
The first line of analysis might be called the "interest group
approach." Professor Philip Monypenny describes grants as a
mechanism through which interest groups seeking a particu-
lar good or service from state or local governments can influ-
ence national political processes to induce the lower levels to
act in the desired way.'7 This line of analysis suggests that it
is easier to forge coalitions at the national level than to do so
in thousands of state and local jurisdictions. It also suggests
that the national government may be more responsive to de-
mands for additional governmental activity, particularly if
"public interest" programs such as income transfers and social
services are involved.' 8
A closely related line of analysis might be called the "cen-
tralist vs. decentralist" approach.' 9 The grant-in-aid device has
appealed to many who advocate a strong federal role in set-
ting domestic priorities, but view the national government as
limited in its authority, either by the Constitution or by tradi-
tion.20 Spending grant funds in accordance with specific fed-
eral conditions contained in the grant statute or implement-
ing regulations, the state and local governments act essen-
tially as "agents" or "subdivisions" of the national govern-
16 See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 984-1002
(1970) [hereinafter cited as MICHELMAN & SANDALOW].
17 Monypenny, Federal Grants-in-Aid to State Governments: A Political Analysis,
13 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 13-16 (1960).
18 M. REAGAN, THE NEw FEDERALISM 84-86 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NEW
FEDERALISM].
19 See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 991-92.
20 See Susskind,Revenue Sharing and the Lessons ofthe New Federalism, 8 URB. L.
ANN. 33, 64, 68-69 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Susskind].
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ment.21 At the same time, however, advocates of decentraliza-
tion have focused on the grant device as a mechanism for en-
hancing the priority-setting and allocational role of state and
local governments by increasing the fiscal resources available
to them.22 Not surprisingly, the decentralists would minimize
the number of federal "strings" attached to any given pro-
gram. The two views outlined under this category are not as
diametrically opposed as might appear to be the case. Of
course, the centralists would like to see the national govern-
ment act without restraints, while the decentralists would
like to see state and local governments left to their own de-
vices. Yet each group regards the grant programs as being in-
finitely preferable to the policy most desired by the other.23
Although the types and extent of "strings" attached to the
grants are still in issue, the seeds of legislative compromise
are present.
A third approach draws upon public finance theories to justify
federal grants. Proponents of this view believe that if
state and local governments are left to their own devices they
might not provide the "correct" level of public goods and serv-
ices. 24 Federal grants are viewed as a means of inducing the
correct allocation of resources by compensating lower levels of
government for benefits which "spill over" from their activi-
ties into the society at large.25 This analysis is often used to
justify fiscal assistance in specific program areas.26
A fourth, and more general, approach is the "fiscal
federalism" or "fiscal mismatch" justification for grants. The
federal government has preempted27 the most productive rev-
enue sources (personal and corporate income taxes), but serv-
ice demands and responsibilities are concentrated at the lower
21 MAXWELL & ARONSON, supra note 12, at 65.
22 See id. at 74-75.
23 Grants also provide "centralists" a mechanism for achieving national minimum
standards in the provision of basic services.
24 "Correct" in this context is defined from the perspective of the national
marketplace for public goods and services. G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 71-77 (3d ed. 1967).
25 Id. at 71-77.
26 Id. at 77; MAXWELL & ARONSON, supra note 12, at 65.
27 Susskind, supra note 20, at 39 n.13.
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levels of government. The financial resources of state and
local governments thus are not equal to the tasks for which
they are responsible. Federal grants can help alleviate this
imbalance. A corollary of the fiscal federalism argument is
the proposition that grants permit the national government to
recognize differences in fiscal capacity among state and local
units (as well as between those levels and the national level)
and to "equalize," or reduce, those differences by providing
proportionately more funds to the poorer jurisdictions. 2
Revenue Sharing itself-defined, for the moment, as a pro-
gram of general purpose federal aid to state and local
government-furnishes a good example of how the above ap-
proaches can overlap. The "fiscal federalism" rationales for
such a program are obvious and were a principal argument of
the program's major academic proponent, Walter Heller.29
The concept also had strong appeal for "decentralists," par-
ticularly the Republican architects of the "New
Federalism. ' 30 Finally, the pressure for Revenue Sharing can
be explained in political terms, although the configuration of
forces represented a variant on Monypenny's model. It was
the state and local governments themselves, through their
elected officials, who asked the federal government for the in-
creased fiscal resources which, presumably, the local political
processes would not provide.
B. How Much Federal Power? -the Question of Strings
This week, I am sending to Congress for its approval for
Fiscal Year 1971, legislation asking that a set amount of
Federal revenues be returned annually to the States to be
used as the States and their local governments see fit-
without Federal strings.-President Richard M. Nixon.31
28 Id. at 67-71. Much of the current debate between the so-called "Sunbelt" and
"Frostbelt" states focuses on whether formulas which measure need by state per capita
income levels or by uniform measures of poverty which fail to account for regional
differentials in cost do, in fact, allocate federal resources on an equalizing basis. See,
e.g., 122 CONG. REC. H6996 (daily ed. June 29, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Harrington).
29 W. HELLER, NEw DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1966) [hereinafter cited
as HELLER].
30 R. NATHAN, A. MANVEL, & S. CALKINS, MONITORING REVENUE SHARING 351-55
(1975) (Brookings Institution) [hereinafter cited as MONITORING REVENUE SHARING].
31 President's Message, supra note 6, at 1144.
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Discussions of federal grant programs are replete with ref-
erences to terms such as federal "conditions," "strings," "con-
trols," "sanctions," and "supervision. '32 These different terms
are not always defined with great precision, yet they are fre-
quently heard in debates over individual grant programs, as
well as in debates over large-scale alterations of the system,
such as President Nixon's ill-fated proposals for "Special Rev-
enue Sharing."33 This section will explain these terms as they
are used in the context of grant programs.
As a starting point, one should recognize that Congress
enacts a grant program in order to further a perceived na-
tional purpose through action by the grantee.34 Since Con-
gress in every case wants the grantee to do something-even
if only to spend the money, in the hypothetical case of "pure"
revenue sharing-the legislation, as well as any implement-
ing regulations by the disbursing federal agency, will contain
directions prescribing grantee activities with the funds. These
directions constitute federally-imposed requirements on gran-
tee governments, the observance of which is a condition to ini-
tial or continued receipt of the funds.
Federal strings may cover much more than the uses to
which particular grant funds are put. Although many
classifications of strings have been suggested, 35 this article
32 E.g., BREAK, supra note 25, at 79; DERTHICK, supra note 15, at 7; MICHELMAN &
SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1199-1200; NEw FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 12.
33 See Fishman, Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974:
New Federal and Local Dynamics in Community Development, 7 URB. L. ANN. 189,
191-200 (1975).
34 Such action might take different forms, e.g., distribution of the funds to
individuals, regulatory programs, or planning.
35 For example, the National Science Foundation developed the following system of
classifying program strings:
fiduciary strings, which are intended to prevent any irresponsibility or
misappropriation in the handling offunds; policy strings, which are intended
to advance national objectives; and constitutional strings, which are
intended to assure that essential commitments of the federal government are
honored.
National Science Foundation, General Revenue Sharing Research Utilization Project
69-70 (Vol. 4, 1975). See also Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal
Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions forBeneficiarylnvolvement, 68 VA.
L. REV. 600, 603-05 (1972).
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will refer to four categories which are particularly applicable
to grant programs. 36
The first category consists of "program expenditure
strings." These govern the functional uses to which the par-
ticular grant funds may be put. For example, Title I of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 listed thir-
teen "eligible activities. '37
The second category consists of "fiduciary-administrative
strings." These include the administrative framework which
the grantee must utilize, for example, a requirement that a
single state agency administer the funds granted, require-
ments concerning accounting procedures and the observance
of applicable state laws, and prohibitions on political activi-
ties by those administering grant funds. 38 The goal of such
36 These categories are based in part on the National Science Foundation's analysis
of General Revenue Sharing.
37 The first four are as follows:
(1) the acquisition of real property (including air rights, water rights, and
other interests therein) which is (A) blighted, deteriorated, deteriorating,
undeveloped, or inappropriately developed from the standpoint of sound
community development and growth; (B) appropriate for rehabilitation or
conservation activities; (C) appropriate for the preservation or restoration
of historic sites, the beautification of urban land, the conservation of open
spaces, natural resources, and scenic areas, the provision of recreational
opportunities, or the guidance of urban development; (D) to be used for the
provision of public works, facilities, and improvements eligible for
assistance under this title; or (E) to be used for other public purposes;
(2) the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or installation of public
works, facilities, and site or other improvements-including neighborhood
facilities, senior centers, historic properties, utilities, streets, street lights,
water and sewer facilities, foundations and platforms for air rights sites,
pedestrian malls and walkways, and park, playgrounds, and recreation
facilities, flood and drainage facilities in cases where assistance for such
facilities under other Federal laws or programs is determined to be
unavailable, and parking facilities, solid waste disposal facilities, and fire
protection services and facilities which are located in or which serve
designated community development areas;
(3) code enforcement in deteriorated or deteriorating areas in which such
enforcement, together with public improvements and services to be
provided, may be expected to arrest the decline of the area; [and,]
(4) clearance, demolition, removal, and rehabilitation of buildings and
improvements (including interim assistance and financing rehabilitation of
privately owned properties when incidental to other activities);...
42 U.S.C.A. § 5305 (West Supp. 1977).
38 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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strings might be summarized as more efficient administra-
tion, both within the particular programs and in general.
The third category consists of "political process-public par-
ticipation strings." These include requirements of public hear-
ings, citizen or expert advisory committees, and specified
roles for the grantee's chief executive and legislative body.39
These strings may be directly related to the program (e.g., Jud-
icial Advisory Committees to plan for court reform under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act) or may advance
more general values such as "revitalizing" local government.
The fourth category consists of "general policy strings," ap-
plicable to a broad range of federal grant programs. Their
source may be statutory or constitutional. Examples are pro-
hibitions on racial, age or sex discrimination, and the re-
quirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. 40
These strings embody generalized policies of the national gov-
ernment, although they may also be directly relevant to the
policies of a particular grant program, such as non-
discrimination in federally-aided education.
C. Enforcing Program Strings-The Concept of Controls
Congress must provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure
that the federal strings attached to each grant program are
observed. This article will use the term "controls" to describe
those mechanisms.41
1. Administrative Controls
The federal administrative process constitutes the principal
set of controls which Congress utilizes to enforce federal
strings.42 Every grant program requires an administering
39 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (c)(3)-(5) (Supp. 1974). See also 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(e)(4)
(1977).
40 See, e.g., Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C.), affd 522 F. 2d
295 (4th Cir. 1975).
41 See DERTHICK, supra note 15, at 7-8, 68. This terminology differs from that of
some analysts who use "control" to refer to direct federal power over grantees, as
distinguished from indirect, limited federal "influence." E.g., id. at 68.
42 As Derthick's study of The Influence of Federal Grants stated, "the pursuit of
federal objectives through the grant system is a task that falls to federal
administrators." Id. at 11.
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agency, even if only to disburse the funds. In fact, grantor
agencies do much more, often fulfilling the traditional admin-
istrative law functions of rule-making and adjudication.
Detailed regulations to implement statutory mandates are
a standard feature of grant administration,43 just as they are
in regulatory programs. The promulgation of regulations by
administrative bodies facilitates law-making by allowing
Congress to compromise on broad goals without becoming
enmeshed in detailed regulation for which it has neither the
resources nor the expertise.44 The factors pushing for a strong
administrative role in the regulatory context may be even
more compelling in the case of grant-in-aid legislation. The
very decision to enact a grant represents a compromise
between performing a function through federal agencies and
leaving the matter entirely in state and local hands. Too much
legislative specificity would destroy the essential "halfway-
house" quality which makes grant programs politically at-
tractive. Thus it falls to the grantor agency to "fill in the
gaps" through regulations and guidelines. Administrative
elaboration of general legislative strings thus is an important
form of federal control.
43 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BLOCK GRANTS: A
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 17-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BLOCK GRANTS].
44 In the context of regulatory programs Professor Stewart offers the following
analysis:
... [T]here appear to be serious institutional constraints on Congress' ability
to specify regulatory policy in meaningful detail. Legislative majorities
typically represent coalitions of interests that must not only compromise
among themselves but also with opponents. Individual politicians often find
far more to be lost than gained in taking a readily identifiable stand on a
controversial issue of social or economic policy. Detailed legislative
specification of policy would require intensive and continuous investigation,
decision, and revision of specialized and complex issues. Such a task would
require resources that Congress has, in most instances, been unable or
unwilling to muster. An across-the-board effort to legislate in detail would
also require a degree of decentralized responsibility that might further erode
an already weak political accountability for congressional decisions. These
circumstances tend powerfully to promote broad delegations of authority to
administrative agencies. Moreover, quite apart from these factors, one may
question whether a legislature is likely in many instances to generate more
responsible decisions or questions of policy than agencies.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,
1695-96 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].
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Apart from policy amplification, grantor agencies under-
take a broad range of other activities in order to implement
their programs and enforce the relevant strings. Most of these
activities c6ncern the disbursement of funds. The grantor
agency has substantial leverage to ensure observance of fed-
eral strings because, with few exceptions, federal grant pro-
grams require some form of grantor approval prior to receipt
of the funds.45 Before receiving its share of the funds, a reci-
pient must first submit, and obtain agency acceptance of, a
"plan!' showing how the funds will be used and specifying how
federal strings will be observed. In her study of welfare ad-
ministration, Professor Derthrick noted that a plan is "like a
contract between the two governments: the state agrees to do
what the plan says, and the federal government agrees to give
grants as long as the state lives up to its plan, or more pre-
cisely, to those elements of its plan that come within the fed-
eral purview as defined by Congress. ' '46 Approval is required
even in the case of programs, such as the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, which compute a recipient's "en-
titlement" through a formula.
The grantor agency has substantial discretion in reviewing
plans, but in theory, it is limited to ascertaining adherence to
the statutory strings. Judicial review of a plan's rejection is
frequently available, but the grantee may not wish to pursue
this avenue for fear of jeopardizing its on-going relationship
with the grantor agency. Congress, of course, can relax this
administrative control by establishing a presumption in favor
of the grantee, and limiting the conditions under which the
grantor agency can disapprove a plan. The leading example is
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of
45 General Revenue Sharing and so-called "Counter-Cyclical Revenue Sharing" (42
U.S.C. § 6721) are the principal exceptions.
46 DERTHICK, supra note 15, at 22. The requirement of plan submission illustrates
nicely the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between "strings" and "controls." In
which category does the submission requirement belong? On the one hand, it is a
condition precedent to receipt of the funds. Thus it might be viewed as a "string." On the
other hand the submission requirement is not a limitation on the actual use of the
funds, although living up to the promises made in it is. On balance it seems more
accurate to view the requirement of plan submission as part of the administrative
control mechanism rather than as a string.
[Vol. 15:1
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1974.47 Even with such provisions, however, an activist gran-
tor agency can exert significant leverage.48
The paradigmatic case of congressional use of the adminis-
trative process as a control on grantee activity is the so-called
t"project grant." These constitute more than two-thirds of all
grant programs, but represent only 25 percent of all grant
funds.4 9 "Project grants... are not necessarily spread among
the states on the basis of any formula. Discretion is conferred
upon the responsible administrators to determine whether a
particular proposal qualifies under the federal program and,
if grant applications exceed available funds, to select from
among competing applications. ' 50 It is in connection with
project grant programs that charges of "grantsmanship" are
most frequently heard, especially the accusation that grantor
agencies develop, somewhat on their own, rigid notions of
what the federal strings are, and award funds only to grantees
who accept those notions. 51
Use of the administrative process as a control on grantee
observance of federal strings is not limited to initial funding
or periodic re-funding decisions. Grantor agencies may con-
duct investigations to verify grantee compliance, as well as
receive and determine third party complaints about non-
47 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304(c) (West Supp. 1977). The original Act provided that "the
Secretary shall approve an application" from a community which is entitled to funds
under the formula unless-
(1) on the basis of significant facts and data, generally available and
pertaining to community and housing needs and objectives, the Secretary
determines that the applicant's description of such needs and objectives is
plainly inconsistent with such facts or data; or
(2) on the basis of the application, the Secretary determines that the
activities to be undertaken are plainly inappropriate to meeting the needs
and objectives identified by the applicant pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section; or
(3) the Secretary determines that the application does not comply with the
requirements of this [title] or other applicable law or proposes activities
which are ineligible under this [title].
48 For example, the Carter Administration's policy at H.U.D. is to enforce the Act's
Housing Assistance Plan requirement much more vigorously than in the past. See, e.g.,
Boston Globe, Nov. 2, 1977, at 10, col 1. H.U.D.'s monitoring of grantee performance
may also be a significant source of agency leverage.
49 Walker, supra note 13, at 75.
50 MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1004.
51 MAXWELL & ARONSON, supra note 12, at 63.
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observance of federal strings. 52 In sum, the management of in-
tergovernmental relations through the exercise of controls
over grantee uses of federal funds is a significant function of
the federal administrative process which supplements the
traditional role of regulation of private conduct.53
2. Legislative Controls
Congressional oversight of federal programs already on the
books usually involves the regulatory activities of federal
agencies. 54 Nonetheless, legislative oversight also plays an
important role in implementing grant programs55 and may
serve as a control on grantee observance of program strings.
For example, during its field monitoring of the early years of
General Revenue Sharing, the Brookings Institution found
that some local officials feared that Congress would not renew
the program if it disapproved of recipients' uses of the funds.56
Most grant programs are enacted for a limited number of
years. One significant legislative control device is the hear-
ings which precede congressional reauthorization, which ex-
amine the performance of the grantor agency and the gran-
tees. Committees delight in focusing the legislative spotlight
on misuses or "frivolous" uses of grant funds, such as the con-
struction of bike-paths and golf courses in wealthy neighbor-
hoods.57 Hearings provide an important opportunity for those
who may be frozen out of the local political processes to raise
issues of grantee non-observance of federal strings, especially
52 See text accompanying notes 193-208 infra.
53 W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 52-53 (6th ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as GELLHORN & Bysa]. It is not yet clear whether traditional administrative law
"doctrine" does or should recognize a sharp distinction between these two uses of the
administrative process. The dissatisfaction with regulatory agencies which Professor
Stewart has perceptively analyzed, see Stewart supra note 43, may have an
intergovernmental counterpart in the frequent criticisms of grantor agencies both by
"public interest" critics and by grantee governments.
54 E.g., Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEais. 593
(1976).
55 See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1122-33.
56 MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 219-20.
57 E.g., CommunityDevelopmentBlock Grant Program: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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those pertaining to discrimination.58 These hearings often
serve as a catalyst for changes in the grant program. For
example, Congress might revise the strings by making them
more explicit, or it might alter the administrative enforce-
ment mechanism.
Most grant programs are subject to the annual appro-
priations process which provides another opportunity for
legislative review of grantee activities. Indeed, many congres-
sional critics of General Revenue Sharing wanted the pro-
gram subject to the appropriations process for precisely this
reason.59
3. Judicial Controls
The role of the federal courts in the network of inter-
governmental relationships60 which the grant system creates
is frequently minimized or ignored by analysts of that sys-
tem.61 Nonetheless, there is a substantial volume of federal
grant litigation, and it appears to be increasing.62 The federal
judicial process represents a significant control mechanism to
ensure grantee compliance with grant program strings.
The most frequent example of judicial control occurs in
"third-party" suits attacking a grant award because the use of
funds does not comply with applicable strings. 63 Plaintiffs
often represent local grant opponents who believe that the
proposed use will harm them, or that alternative uses are pre-
ferable.64 In other cases, particularly those involving allega-
58 Id.; Civil Rights Aspects of General Revenue Sharing: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
59 See text accompanying notes 293-297 infra.
60 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970).
61 E.g., Wright,Revenue Sharing and StructuralFeatures ofAmericanFederalism,
419 ANNALS 100 (1975).
62 See generally Kushner,Litigation Strategies andJudicial Review Under Title lof
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 11 URn. L. ANN. 37 (1976).
63 E.g., Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783
(E.D. Tenn. 1975); Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Attacks by
welfare recipients on the adequacy of state "plans" are a frequent example of third
party suits. E.g., Bourgeois v. Stevens, 532 F.2d 799, 807 (lst Cir. 1976).
64 E.g., Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433
(N.D. Cal. 1968).
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tions of discrimination, plaintiffs may not dispute the
functional area of the expenditure, but rather they object to
conditions within the grantees' direct control. For example,
when a police department receiving grant funds maintains
discriminatory hiring practices, suits to cut off the funding
would be aimed at eradicating discrimination.6 5 Once the
department stopped discriminating, plaintiffs probably would
not object to federal assistance to local law enforcement agen-
cies. Although the distinction is not always clear-cut, such
suits might be termed "general leverage suits," as opposed to
"particular project opposition suits." In every case, of course,
violation of grant program strings is at issue.
Many third-party suits are brought against the federal offi-
cials charged with disbursing the funds. Whether Congress
regards such litigation as a component of the grant condition
enforcement process is far from clear. Plaintiffs frequently
seek "non-statutory review" of the grant award, there being no
specific review provision in the grant statute nor any applica-
ble general statutory provision authorizing review of agency
action.66 Previous lower court holdings that section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act constitutes a grant of general
statutory review are now overruled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Califano v. Sanders.67 Third-party suits against
grantor agencies based on non-discrimination strings may,
however, fall under the heading of specific statutory review.68
Non-statutory review-review based on the general jurisdic-
tional provisions of Title 28-is greatly facilitated by the 1976
Amendments to the Judicial Code which removed the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement in suits against federal officials
"arising under" the laws of the United States.69 Even before
this liberalizing amendment, Professors Michelman and San-
65 E.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
66 On the differences among "specific statutory review," "general statutory
review," and "non-statutory review" see GELLHORN & BYsE,supra note 53, at 145-67.
67 97 S.Ct. 980 (1977).
68 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3766(c) (West Supp. 1977) (right to challenge discriminatory
use of Safe Streets Act funds). It is not clear whether this statute permits an action to be
brought against the grantor agency. The issues raised are similar to those concerning
citizens suits under the Revenue Sharing statute.
69 Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721(1976).
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dalow had detected a "veritable explosion" of third-party
suits.7° Despite questions whether courts are "likely to be able
to make a useful contribution to issues of the type which arise
before agencies dispensing grants,"71 suits against federal of-
ficials seem to have posed few institutional problems for the
courts. Judges apparently view them as not unusual examples
of administrative law disputes. 2 Plaintiffs have won a
number of victories, even though delay of the grant rather
than outright invalidation may be the result.73
In a number of cases, third parties have brought suit in fed-
eral court directly against the grantee or its officials to enjoin
expenditure of grant funds allegedly in violation of program
strings, rather than against the grantor agency to review its
disbursement of the funds.7 4 Although some of these suits
have been successful, they may present difficult "threshold"
questions of jurisdiction, and the existence of an "implied
right of action" based on the grant-in-aid statute.75 Such di-
rect suits also pose institutional questions concerning the
proper role of the federal courts. To some extent the judicial
process is being invoked as a substitute for the administrative
process which normally plays the dominant role in grant pro-
gram enforcement, rather than as a mechanism to review the
administrative process.
A role for the federal courts in the grant system which is
70 MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, SUPPLEMENT 275 (1972); see
Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 35, at 630.
71 MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1111.
72 E.g., City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 903 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'd. sub
nom. City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 766 (1978).
73 Id.
74 Schreiber v. Lugar, 518 F.2d 1099 (7th Cir. 1975); Mathews v. Massell, 356 F.
Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
75 E.g., Schreiber v. Lugar, 518 F.2d 1099, 1101-1105 (7th Cir. 1975); see generally
MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, SUPPLEMENT 276-78 (1972). But see Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir.
1977). The jursidictional and right of action obstacles are encountered only in suits
against grantees and their officials, and only in non-civil rights cases. Plaintiffs may
be able to overcome these obstacles by suing federal defendants and joining state or
local officials. E.g., Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F.
Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). The latter might be viewed as "pendent parties."But see
Aldinger v. Howard 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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close to the judiciary's traditional reviewing function is con-
ferred by a number of statutes which authorize the grantee to
seek judicial review of grantor agency decisions denying or
terminating assistance.7 6 Here the courts act not as a control
mechanism on grantee observance of program- strings, but as
a check on the administrative process. Such statutory pro-
visions might be viewed either as typical provisions for judi-
cial review of administrative action to ensure agency adher-
ence to legislative directions, or as an attempt to increase
grantee leverage against the grantor agency in order to en-
hance grantee power in the allocation decision. 7 In designing
grant programs Congress has frequently shown an awareness
of the tension between a desire for respect of the allocation de-
cisions of elected state and local officials and the need for re-
course to non-elected federal administrators to "police" those
decisions when the funds being allocated come from the fed-
eral treasury. The National Land Use Planning Act, which
passed the Senate in 1973, went so far as to provide that any
decision by the Secretary of the Interior to deny funds to a
state would be subject to review by an "arbitration panel"
composed of one governor, a federal official from another
cabinet department, and a private citizen.7 8 The proposal was
never enacted, and judicial review of negative agency deci-
sions seems Congress' preferred institutional route for re-
conciling the tension.
It seems fairly clear that the federal judicial process can
serve as an important control mechanism in the operation of
federal grant programs. Whether it should may "depend upon
the assumptions one makes concerning the character and in-
tensity of the interests" present in a particular allocation of
federal funds, 79 the proper allocation of roles among the legis-
lative, administrative and judicial branches, and the results,
including available remedies, ofjudicial intervention."
76 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3759 (1970).
77 See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1107-14.
78 S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 305(a) (1973).
79 MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1110; see Tomlinson & Masbaw,
supra note 35, at 634-37 (questioning utility of grant litigation).
80 One result, of course, may be delay. As for remedies, the sanctions available to
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D. The Grant-in-Aid Spectrum-From Categoricals to
General Revenue Sharing
1. The Spectrum
Over the years, scholars have developed several different
approaches to classifying federal grants by program structure.
The emergence in recent years of "tblock grants" and Revenue
Sharing has led analysts to classify grant programs primarily
according to the relative flexibility which the authorizing sta-
tute accords to grantees in their expenditure of the funds. An
example is Reagan's distinction between categorical and block
grants:
categorical grants are by and large those for specifically
and narrowly defined purposes, leaving very little dis-
cretionary room on the part of a recipient government as
to how it uses the grant, while block grants are broader in
scope and although tied to a clearly stated area (such as
health, or elementary education, or community facilities
development) they do not specify the exact objects of per-
mitted expenditure an& hence create much larger zones of
discretion on the part of the receiving government or
agency.81
This classification is helpful, as far as it goes. However, one
can further hypothesize that a relaxation of grantor-imposed
strings will be accompanied by a relaxation of grantor con-
trols as well, since it is the strings which necessitate the re-
course to controls. A classification based on the extent of
strings and controls can be seen in David Walker's criteria for
distinguishing block grants from categoricals:
Conceptually,... a block grant is supposed to embody
five basic differentiating traits. These are:
-it authorizes Federal aid for a wide range of activities
within a broad functional area;
the courts are generally similar to those available to grantor agencies. Thus a court
may invalidate a particular use of grant funds, or suspend it until program strings are
complied with. See generally United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.
1977).
81 NEw FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 59.
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-it gives recipient jurisdictions fairly wide discretion
in identifying problems and designing programs to deal
with them;
-its administrative, fiscal reporting, and other
federally-established program requirements are geared to
keeping grantor instrusiveness to a minimum, while rec-
ognizing the need to ensure that broad national goals are
accomplished;
-it is distributed by formula, which narrows grantor
administrative discretion and provides some sense of fis-
cal certainty for grantees; and
-its eligibility provision is fairly specific, relatively
restrictive, and tends to favor general purpose govern-
ments, elected policy officials, and administrative
generalists. 82
Using this approach, one can identify three relatively clear
points on the grant-in-aid spectrum: categorical grants, block
grants, and Revenue Sharing. Categorical grants are for rela-
tively narrow program purposes, and grantee observance of
strings is ensured by strict grantor (especially administrative)
controls.8 3 Block grants afford the grantee greater flexibility
in fund allocation decisions and do not permit the grantor to
retain much power over those decisions. Revenue Sharing
represents a step beyond block grants. In its "pure" form, Rev-
enue Sharing might consist of a guaranteed annual distribu-
tion to grantees based on a formula, but without strings and
control mechanisms. However, Revenue Sharing as enacted
by Congress never has conformed to the "pure" model.84
82 D. Walker, The Changing Pattern of Federal Assistance to State and Local
Governments 10 (July 29, 1976) (on file with the author).
83 Id. at 8.
84 General Revenue Sharing is discussed more fully in subsection E, infra. At this
point it may be helpful to distinguish that program from "Special Revenue Sharing," a
concept which President Nixon advocated repeatedly, but without success. Special
Revenue Sharing represents a point on the spectrum somewhere between block grants
and General Revenue Sharing. Grantee expenditures would be limited to one
relatively broad area such as "law enforcement," and there would be very few grantor
level controls. Federal agency approval ofa "plan" prior to distributing the funds would
not be required. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 33, at 195-96. Some analysts have
suggested that Special Revenue Sharing was little more than another name for block
grants. BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 42, at 20. The Advisory Commission on
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2. The "Changing Pattern" of Federal Grants85
Strings and controls present Congress with a number of
structural options in designing a grant program. Yet, as re-
cently as the mid-1960's, virtually all federal grants to units
of state and local government took the form of categorical pro-
grams. With the development of block grants in the late
1960's, the pattern began to shift. The enactment of General
Revenue Sharing intensified this shift. While in Fiscal Year
1972, categoricals still accounted for more than 97 percent of
grant funds, by Fiscal Year 1976 the respective percentages
were, approximately: categoricals, 75 percent; block grants, 12
percent; and, general support (primarily Revenue Sharing), 12
percent."6
There is every indication that this tripartite system will
continue, and that Congress will continue to experiment with
different combinations along the spectrum of federal strings
and controls.8 7 The non-categorical programs have demon-
strated their staying power, although at least one observer
has detected signs that the federal government is reducing the
scope of state discretion in the renewal of block grants.88 The
Ford Administration advanced an unsuccessful proposal for
consolidating a large number of categorical programs into
block grants.8 9 The Carter Administration reportedly has
considered converting the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act into a form of Special Revenue Sharing.90 At the
Intergovernmental Relations felt that the absence of any matching requirement was
an important factor differentiating "Special Revenue Sharing" from block grants. Id.
at 19. In any event, Congress has not been receptive to the particular mix ofstrings and
controls which the Special Revenue Sharing proposals represented.
85 See generally D. Walker, The Changing Pattern of Federal Assistance to State
and Local Governments 10 (July 29,1976) (on file with the author).
86 See Walker, supra note 13, at 75.
87 The "counter-cyclical" aid programs represent the latest variations on the
traditional forms.
88 E.g., NEw FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 101.
89 See BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 43, at 19.
90 Department of Justice, Restructuring the Justice Department's Program of
Assistance to State and Local Governments for Crime Control and Criminal Justice
System Improvement 16-18 (June 23, 1977) (on file with the author). See, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1977, at 17, col. 2. (Attorney General Bell proposes abolition of Law
Enforcement Assistance Agency and changes in program to "increase the program
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same time, the number of categorical programs has continued
to grow, a trend which was unaffected by the Nixon Adminis-
tration.91 The exact future of the changing pattern of federal
aid cannot be predicted, but one thing seems likely. General
Revenue Sharing marks the outer boundary of congressional
willingness to renounce federal strings and controls.
E. The Revenue Sharing Controversy and the 1972 Act-New
Federalism Triumphant
1. The Debate
The concept of unrestricted federal aid to states and
localities has generated intense controversy from the moment
it initially surfaced in press accounts of the so-called Heller-
Pechman plan. The plan, which was prepared for President
Johnson during tle 1964 election campaign, proposed sharing
a fixed percentage of federal income tax revenues with the
states. At the time, proponents of the plan envisioned it as a
primary means of reducing fiscal drag.92 However, because
the proposal engendered immediate and heated opposition,
the President decided to delay its release. When subsequent
expenditures for the Vietnam War and Great Society categor-
ical grants absorbed more and more federal revenues,
lIrlevenue sharing did not surface again as a serious policy al-
ternative under President Johnson. ''93 Yet debate over the
concept went on, culminating in enactment of the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. The controversy produced
a plethora of arguments and counter-arguments. 94 The two
flexibility of state and local governments and strengthen their priority setting roles
and responsibilities").
91 Walker, supra note 13, at 63.
92 "If the long run elasticity of tax yield with respect to GNP [Gross National
Product] exceeds unity, federal revenues will increase over time more rapidly than
GNP ... [t]hus the budget imposes a restraint on desirable economic expansion, and
this is the phenomenon ... called 'fiscal drag.' [T]he drag of the budget [can] be
converted into a 'fiscal dividend' which could take the form of new or enlarged
government programs or of reduced tax burdens." T. DERNBURG D. McDOUGALL,
MACROECONOMICS 403-04 (4th ed. 1972).
93 MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 350.
94 E.g., Stolz, Revenue Sharing-New American Revolution or Trojan Horse? 58
MINN. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stolz].
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main areas of disagreement were the fiscal wisdom of revenue
sharing and the impact of any such program on the federal
system.
The fiscal debate centered on several issues, including
whether a "fiscal crisis" existed at the state and local levels;
the relative superiority of national over sub-national revenue
raising capability; and the possibility of constructing an
equitable distribution formula that could reflect the dis-
parities in need among thousands of governmental units.
In the context of this article, however, the debate over the
program's impact on the federal system was far more signifi-
cant, for many participants recognized that what was at stake,
at least in the short run, was a major shift in decision-making
power from national to local hands.95 This ideological debate
matched proponents of Nixon's "New Federalism" against
supporters of the existing pattern of "cooperative federalism"
based on the categorical grants.96 Defenders of cooperative
federalism rested their case primarily on the superiority of
national decision-making over state local decision-making,
and, secondarily, on the greater degree of competence among
federal administrative personnel. Both are recurrent themes
in American federalism debates, especially the belief that
Congress takes a broader view of the "public interest," par-
ticularly the rights of minorities, whether because of the na-
tional legislature's relative insulation from the vicissitudes of
"faction," or because national officeholders are less likely
than their sub-national counterparts to be dominated by the
views of state and local elites.97 Those who adhere to the
95 Reagan, The Pro and Con Arguments, 419 ANNALS 23, 27 (1975).
96 NEw FEDERALISM, supra note 18,.at 89-132.
97 Cole, Revenue Sharing: Citizen Participation and Social Service Aspects, 419
ANNALS 69 (1975).
The following comment by Michael Reagan epitomizes both the substance and the
rhetoric of this "centralist" view.
Perhaps the most basic group of arguments in favor of specific grants-in-aid
as the means the federal government uses to help states and localities
financially-and equally the most basic set of arguments against general
revenue sharing-revolves around the ideas that there are a number of
identifiable national objectives to be obtained through domestic public
policies; that the concept of national citizenship establishes an intellectual
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Advocates of the "New Federalism" challenged the cen-
tralist premise of national superiority, and articulated the
advantages of decentralizing decisions about the disposition of
grant funds. The New Federalists maintained that state and
local officials were also capable of making valid decisions
about state and local matters, and might, in fact, make better
decisions since they were "closer" to the problems and "to the
people." Furthermore, the New Federalists argued, state and
local governments could be "revitalized" if given more re-
sources since the increased allocational power would call forth
greater citizen interest and participation in how it was exer-
cisedf 9 Although many of the New Federalist arguments
were conservative, both in their tone and their sources, at
least one prominent liberal, Walter Heller, believed in re-
vitalizing state and local units. Writing in 1966, he contended
that the service functions of state and local governments are
inherently redistributive and, therefore, consistent with the
centralist view of the public interest.100
The New Federalists' faith in the virtue of decentralization
and their de-emphasis of national priority-setting led to a vi-
sion of the grant system relatively free of federal strings and
the controls to enforce them.' 10 They opposed federal strings
and controls not only on ideological grounds, but also because
cooperative federalist stand favor a grant-in-aid system
characterized by extensive strings of all four types described
above, 98 and strict controls, especially administrative en-
forcement.
and ethical base for national criteria of equity in the provision of public
services and a national minimum standard of living; that nationally raised
funds should not be utilized without some accountability to national criteria;
and that proven inefficiency of state and local governments and proven lack
of concern of middle class political majorities for the needs of ethnic
minorities and the poor require that the national government use financial
leverage if equity is to be attained and national social responsibility is to be
served. All of these reasons together constitute a very strong argument
against simply handing out money with no strings attached.
Reagan, supra note 108, at 29.
98 See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
99 See generally Susskind, supra note 20, at 35-37, 42-44.
100 HELLER, supra note 29, at 132-44.
101 See Fishman, supra note 33, at 190.
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experience had shown these mechanisms to be unworkable
and counterproductive. Horror stories of red-tape and over-
lapping bureaucracies were buttressed by fiscal analyses
which indicated that grantee budgetary decisions were "dis-
torted" away from local priorities in order to "buy into" avail-
able categorical grants.10 2 Lurking in the background was the
academic criticism that some categorical grant programs had
proven to be antidemocratic. These critics argued that al-
liances which developed between grantor and grantee agen-
cies had usurped the power over spending priorities once ex-
clusively wielded by elected public officials.
10 3
Although the New Federalists vigorously challenged the
categorical grants, they did not seek initially to scrap the
existing system but to supplement it by the addition of
General Revenue Sharing and block grants. After a pro-
tracted congressional battle, they won a major victory in 1972
with the enactment of General Revenue Sharing. 1
0 4
2. The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972
The original Revenue Sharing Act provided for distribution
of approximately 30 billion dollars over a period of five years.
The recipients of the money were the 50 state governments
themselves and all "units of general government" within the
states, including counties, municipalities and townships. 0 5
State governments were to receive one-third of the funds, and
the remainder was allocated to local units. Funds were dis-
tributed to state areas in accordance with either of two for-
mulas, the applicable formula being the one which yielded the
greatest amount of aid to a given state. The Senate formula
was based on population multiplied by tax effort and per
capita income, while the House formula was based on popula-
tion, per capita income, urbanized population, income tax ef-
fort and general tax effort. 10 6 The program was exempt from
the annual congressional appropriations process. Thus reci-
102 Stolz, supra note 94, at 19-23.
103 See Wright, supra note 61, at 109-115.
104 See generally MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 355-72.
105 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 108(d)(1).
106 Id. § 106. For discussion of the formula, see Stolz, supra note 94, at 33-59.
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pients could count on a predictable amount of funds for a
known period of time, just as they could estimate collections
from their own revenue sources. This certainty was finite,
however, since grantees could not count on renewal of the
program upon its expiration in 1976. Although referred to as a
ttno strings" program, the General Revenue Sharing legisla-
tion contained numerous strings as well as a control
mechanism to enforce them.
a. Program-Expenditure Strings
Congress imposed no functional limitations on expenditures
by state governments. Local governments, however, could
only expend Revenue Sharing funds within nine "priority ex-
penditures" categories:
(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating
expenses for
(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire pro-
tection, and building code enforcement),
(B) environmental protection (including sewage dispo-
sal, sanitation, and pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems
and streets and roads),
(D) health,
(E) recreation,
(F) libraries,
(G) social services for the poor or aged, and
(H) financial administration; and
(2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures au-
thorized by law.10 7
In addition, no recipient could use directly or indirectly Reve-
nue Sharing funds to satisfy the "matching" requirements of
other federal grant programs.10 8
Whether these limitations were illusory, especially the
Ccpriority" categories, has been discussed frequently.1° 9 The
Act contained no "maintenance of effort" provision requiring
107 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 103(a).
108 Id. § 104(a).
109 E.g., Stolz, supra note 94, at 59-71. Stolz believes the limitations were illusory.
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expenditures within the categories to remain at previous
levels, and thus raised the possibility of a problem referred to
as "fungibility." This problem occurs when a local government
applies its Revenue Sharing money to an eligible activity,
e.g., public safety, reduces its contribution of its own funds to
that activity by an equivalent amount, and transfers the
"freed-up" money to an ineligible category, such as educa-
tion.110 Nonetheless, these priority categories were part of the
legislation and proved to be enforceable, at least in extreme
cases.11'
b. Fiduciary-Administrative Strings
The Act contained several strings designed to ensure that
recipients actually spent the money, that they acted at least
as honestly and efficiently as they would with their own
funds, and that the federal government knew what they had
done. From the grantee perspective, perhaps most significant
was the requirement that a recipient expend Revenue Shar-
ing funds "only in accordance with the laws and procedures
applicable to the expenditure of its own revenues .... ,"112 This
provision prevents the grantee's executive branch from treat-
ing the funds as a "blank check" free from legislative author-
ity, and it also triggers the considerable body of state controls
over local finance.' 1 3
The reporting requirements of the former section 121 seem
designed primarily to facilitate federal monitoring of grantee
activities, although they may also enhance citizen participa-
tion in allocation decisions. This section required periodic
submission to the Secretary of the Treasury (grantor agency)
of reports outlining the "planned" use of Revenue Sharing
funds, and reports "setting forth the amounts and purposes for
which funds received ... have been spent or obligated." Given
110 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 75-80.
111 Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
112 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 123(a)(4). Technically this provision only
required that a recipient make assurances that it would follow these "laws and
procedures." However, the O.R.S. has always interpreted it as a requirement that the
assurances be followed.
113 See text accompanying notes 223-224 infra.
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the "fungibility" problem discussed above, the accuracy of
these reports is open to debate. 11
4
c. Political Process-Public Participation Strings
Proponents of Revenue Sharing had claimed that the program
would increase citizen participation in state and local political
processes. Yet the Act "differ[ed] from the major federally
funded domestic programs of recent years in that, as approved
by Congress in 1972, [it] require[d] absolutely no citizen input
in the expenditure of funds."1 5 One observer has stated that
"the intent of the Congress" to encourage citizen participation
"Cseems fairly clear;" 1 6 but such clarity is not evident from a
careful reading of the text of the 1972 Act. Section 121(c) did
require recipients to publish, in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in their area, the Planned Use and Actual Use Reports
described above. The Act also required recipients to "advise
the news media" of the reports' publication. Since the Act thus
ensured some public awareness of Revenue Sharing allocation
decisions, one can infer that Congress did, indeed, favor public
participation in those decisions. However, Congress left the
form and extent of such participation, if any, in the hands of
state and local officials. In this respect, the Act's requirement
that recipients spend Revenue Sharing funds "only in accord-
ance with the laws and procedures" applicable to the expendi-
ture of their own revenues is important. Such "laws and pro-
cedures" might require citizen input through public hdarings,
advisory committees and other mechanisms. Moreover, state
and local officials were free to provide special participation
mechanisms for Revenue Sharing allocation decisions. 117
d. General Policy Strings
The principal string of this nature was the prohibition
against grantee discrimination "on the ground of race, color,
national origin, or sex" in "any program or activity funded in
114 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 78-80.
115 Cole, supra note 97, at 68.
116 Lief, Revenue Sharing and Citizen Participation, in GENERAL REVENUE
SHARING AND DECENTRALIZATION 92 (N. Scheffer ed. 1975).
117 MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 266-67.
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whole or in part.. ." with Revenue Sharing funds. 18 The ex-
tent to which the Revenue Sharing program is subject to other
general policy strings, contained in statutes purportedly ap-
plying across the board to federal assistance programs, has
been an area of uncertainty. One could argue that Revenue
Sharing funds are different from other grant monies because
the basic allocation decision is local, not federal. Moreover,
the virtual absence of federal involvement justifies exemption
from general congressional directives. In Carolina Action v.
Simon, the Fourth Circuit adopted this view by holding that
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
did not apply to projects funded by Revenue Sharing." 9
e. Administrative Controls
Since the Revenue Sharing Act did contain strings, an en-
forcement mechanism (or mechanisms) was necessary. To
some extent the Act resembled other grant programs in that a
federal agency, the Department of the Treasury, was to play a
substantial role in disbursing funds and ensuring compliance.
Thus the Secretary of the Treasury delegated his authority to
the Office of Revenue Sharing and was responsible for prom-
ulgating regulations, computing grantee entitlements under
the formula, and monitoring grantee compliance.' 20
However, the principal administrative control which Con-
gress utilizes in grant programs-federal agency approval of
grantee uses and related activities prior to disbursing the
funds-was not included in the Act.121 Recipients must, it is
true, make general assurances that they will comply with
specified requirements, but this is a far cry from submission,
subject to approval, of a plan. The absence of this key adminis-
trative control constitutes one of the major differences be-
tween Revenue Sharing and virtually all previous forms of
federal domestic assistance. This difference reflected the de-
sire of Congress and, especially, the Nixon Administration to
reduce the influence of federal administrators over local allo-
118 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 122(a).
119 522 F.2d 295 (4th Cir.), affg 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
120 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, §§ 105, 123, 142.
121 Id. § 123(a).
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cational decisions. The absence of this federal administrative
control also increased the power of local elected officials by
preventing the development of powerful "alliances" between
grantor officials and their administrative counterparts at the
state and local levels. 122
f. Other Controls
The 1972 Act contained virtually no legislative controls, as
that term is used in this article. Revenue Sharing was exempt
from the annual appropriations process. There was no provi-
sion for periodic congressional review. 123 However, legislative
control is never totally absent from a grant program, since
Congress remains free to amend or terminate it, if only at the
expiration date. In the case of Revenue Sharing, state and
local officials were acutely aware of the specter of non-
renewal, and this awareness affected their spending deci-
sions. 24 As for judicial controls, the 1972 Act was silent on
the subject of "third-party" suits to enforce its provisions. But
it did authorize grantees to seek judicial review of administra-
tive sanctions.
II. NEW FEDERALISM AT BAY-THE RENEWAL DEBATE AND THE
1976 AMENDMENTS
A. The Monitoring-Research Efforts
Federal grant programs, once enacted, usually achieve a
permanent status. The beneficiaries (both recipient govern-
ments and particular constituencies) represent a vested inter-
est in continuation, and the opponents go off to fight other
battles. This was not the scenario with Revenue Sharing,
however. "[P]ublic, academic and professional interest in the
program exceeded that of almost any previous domestic policy
...,'125 and it soon became clear that this intense scrutiny
was providing powerful ammunition for those who wanted to
122 Wright, supra note 61.
123 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 5306(1) (West Supp. 1977) (special report to Congress on
operation of Community Development Block Grant formula).
124 MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 219-20.
125 CAPUTO & COLE, REVENUE SHARING IX (1975).
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terminate Revenue Sharing when the authorization ran out
in 1976.126 When the question of renewal did arise, of course,
the terms of debate shifted away from issues of how Revenue
Sharing would work to issues of how it had worked or had not
worked.127 In the debate those who had conducted "objective
research" which demonstrated the program's "results" en-
joyed considerable advantages.
Two separate but interrelated streams of monitoring and
research began almost immediately after enactment. The first
was what might be called the "public interest" monitoring.
This effort consisted of research spearheaded by the League of
Women Voters, the National Urban Coalition, the Center for
National Policy Review and the Center for Community
Change. The second set of monitoring research activities, can
be conveniently labelled the "academic" efforts. This work
was carried out by academic and research institutions (espe-
cially the Brookings Institution) with substantial support
from the National Science Foundation.128
Beyond ascertaining which jurisdictions got how much
money, most aspects of Revenue Sharing monitoring and re-
search turned out to be unexpectedly complex and difficult.
The academic literature contains extensive discussions of the
methodological problems presented by efforts to determine
how the money was spent, for example. 129 Moreover, many of
the monitoring research efforts, especially those of the "public
interest" groups, appeared to be "programs of research that
reflected strongly held values."130 One analyst found "a par-
ticularly disconcerting intermingling of value judgment and
fact" in much of the research, and warned that "[tihere is no-
thing new about programs being misevaluated due to faulty
data and undue speed with Congress ... accepting the evalua-
tions and stopping or changing programs before they have
126 See SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 1.
127 Reagan, supra note 95, at 24.
128 See SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, 7-10.
129 E.g., Lovell, General Revenue Sharing and Categorical Grants, GENERAL
REVENUE SHARING AND DECENTRALIZATION 115 (N. Scheffer ed. 1975).
130 Rosenthal, Policy Analysis and Political Action: Advice to Princelings,
REVENUE SHARING 149 (Caputo and Cole eds. 1975).
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been really tried."'131 Despite such strictures, however, it
seems fairly clear that the output of both sets of research
played an important role in congressional debates over re-
newal, and led to many of the changes in the program con-
tained in the renewal amendments.
B. Major Areas of Controversy in the Act's Operation
1. Actual Uses of Revenue Sharing Funds
How recipients were actually using Revenue Sharing funds,
and whether these uses were "desirable" constituted the prin-
cipal area of controversy during the four years between
enactment and renewal. Researchers disagreed among them-
selves over how to determine the actual uses. Approaches in-
cluded working with the Actual Use Reports submitted to the
Office of Revenue Sharing, sending observers into the field to
conduct case analyses, and utilizing survey techniques to de-
termine how grantee officials thought (or would say) they had
spent the money. 132 The "fungibility" problem posed serious
obstacles to any approach which asked "how was the money
spent?" The Brookings Institution and other researchers di-
rected considerable attention to net fiscal effects by posing
this question: "how would expenditure and revenue policies be
different in the absence of general revenue sharing funds?"'133
Despite the methodological difficulties, a number of gener-
ally accepted conclusions about the first four years seem to
emerge from the research literature. First, Revenue Sharing
generated substantial new capital spending activities, espe-
cially by smaller and relatively wealthy units of government.
The Brookings Institution's monitoring effort showed an even-
tual drop in the "new capital spending" percentage of local
government decisions, but this category still represented by far
the largest percentage of identifiable spending decisions.1 34 A
second general conclusion is that financially troubled units of
government, especially central cities, used Revenue Sharing
131 Lovell, supra note 129, at 117, 121-22.
132 See Wright, supra note 61, at 107, 115.
133 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 27,28 (emphasis added). See also id. at 24-42.
134 Id. at 31 (Table 2-1).
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funds "simply to hold the line fiscally."135 Finally, to the ex-
tent that direct expenditures could be measured, a relatively
small percentage of Revenue Sharing funds were allocated to
social service programs.136 For example, one analyst found "a
miniscule response on the part of local governments to the
needs of the poor and aged. '1 37
All three of these conclusions figured prominently in the
renewal debate, but the issue of Revenue Sharing's failure to
help the disadvantaged was uppermost in the controversy
over uses.138 Some congressmen argued that the needs of the
disadvantaged and elderly constituted a first order national
priority, and that Revenue Sharing, in actual operation, had
proved unresponsive to this priority.139 Counter-arguments
were not lacking. It may be, for example, that the elderly
value increased police protection as much as direct expendi-
tures on their behalf. Property tax stabilization may be bene-
ficial to low income people. 40
The spending "results" clearly put Revenue Sharing advo-
cates on the defensive. It became apparent that the most
likely remedies were either more congressional direction in
the establishment of eligible activities, or efforts to utilize
Revenue Sharing to alter the processes of local governments
as a means of increasing the power of those who were not ben-
efitting from the program.
2. The Extent of Citizen Participation in Revenue Sharing
Decisions
Some supporters of the initial Revenue Sharing Act be-
lieved that "by providing greater discretion to generalist offi-
cials [it] would stimulate a more competitive environment
within which state and local budgets are decided, at least for
that portion of the budget affected by intergovernmental
135 Id. at 106.
136 Id. at 70-71.
137 Susskind, supra note 20, at 49 (commenting on an analysis of General Revenue
Sharing allocations prepared by the Comptroller General).
138 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 70.
139 E.g., 121 CONG. REC. H6274 (daily ed. June 26,1975) (remarks ofRep. Drinan).
140 Lovell, supra note 129, at 142.
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grant revenues.' 141 Thus monitors of Revenue Sharing closely
analyzed the extent of citizen participation in fiscal decisions,
and the extent to which the program could be associated with
increased citizen influence on the budgetary process. Based on
the program's first two years, the Director of the Office of the
Revenue Sharing cited a "rekindling of citizen interest and
participation in local government [which] gives new meaning
to the concept of local accountability .... -142 This panglossian
view was not universal. A "public interest" spokesman con-
cluded from the monitoring and research efforts that "by and
large... citizen involvement is neither broad nor deep."'1 43 A
major congressional critic went so far as to state that the re-
cord showed "that citizen participation in the expenditure of
revenue sharing funds has been virtually nil to date."144
In fact, the research findings on this issue are somewhat
mixed. There is some agreement that small governments ex-
hibited less tendency to open up the appropriations process
than large governments.. 45 However, one of the leading
analysts of the participation issue concluded that "the most
surprising finding of the available research is that citizen
interest in revenue sharing allocations is intense and that
many cities have encouraged or allowed some degree of citizen
input."146
Even a mixed record on this issue was enough to put Reve-
nue Sharing advocates on the defensive, especially given the
exaggerated preenactment claims of what the program would
do. Substantial evidence of "the unwillingness of local offi-
cials to open up the budgetary process to the public or to urge
citizen participation in the allocation of revenue sharing
funds"'147 jeopardized the chances for renewal.
141 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 108.
142 Watt, Reaffirming the Federal Compact: General Revenue Sharing and the
Federal System, GENERAL REVENUE SHARING AND DECENTRALIZATION 81 (N. Scheffer
ed. 1975).
143 Lief, supra note 116, at 101.
144 H.R. REP. No. 94-1165, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 91, 92 (1976) (supplemental
views of Rep. Drinan) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 1976 H. REP.].
145 Sokolow, Small Community Policy Making and the Revenue Sharing Program,
REVENUE SHARING 6 (Caputo & Cole eds. 1975).
146 Cole, supra note 97, at 68.
147 Susskind, supra note 20, at 47.
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3. Discrimination in the Uses of Revenue Sharing Funds
One of the major domestic roles of the federal government
has been the protection of minorities, especially racial
minorities, against discrimination by state and local govern-
ments. That such a role is both proper and necessary is a fun-
damental tenet of American federalism. Therefore, the wide-
spread assertion that Revenue Sharing, in fact, perpetuated
and encouraged discriminatory practices by local govern-
ments posed a serious threat to the program's renewal. Critics
were concerned not only with the practices of recipients, but
also with the enforcement activities of the federal govern-
ment.
"Discrimination" means different things to different people.
Conduct which does not violate the Constitution may, nonethe-
less, run afoul of anti-discrimination statutes.148 Whether the
term refers solely to intentional deprivations or more broadly
includes the failure to remedy past intentional deprivations is,
of course, a major legal and political issue. Although section
122 of the Revenue Sharing Act authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to enforce its anti-discrimination provision, studies
detected substantial discrimination by local governments in
both senses. Critics focused on the employment practices of
local governments and on the provision of services.1 49 The
employment discrimination accusations, both "active" and
"passive," involved exclusion of racial minorities and women.
The provision of services issue involved lower levels of service
to "poor and minority areas."' 50 According to one congressional
critic, "the United States Civil Rights Commission, the Na-
tional Urban League, and other organizations which have in-
vestigated ... General Revenue Sharing have documented
thousands upon thousands of cases in which local governments
have used ... funds in ways that discriminate against politi-
cally vulnerable groups. Employment discrimination has been
the most prevalent form."'51
148 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
149 P. BLAIR, GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN AMERICAN CITIES: FIRST IMPRESSIONS
13-14 (1974).
150 Id. at 14. The employment practices of local government contractors were also
cited.
151 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 87 (supplemental views of Rep. Conyers).
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The inclusion of the anti-discrimination provision in the
Revenue Sharing Act did not guarantee its vigorous enforce-
ment. Rarely has a federal agency charged with enforcing
grant program strings come under such widespread condem-
nation. The Office of Revenue Sharing's (ORS) "laxity" was
said to have " paralyzed civil rights enforcement under the act
.... "152 The ORS apparently was unsure of the extent of its au-
thority to terminate funding and complained, somewhat jus-
tifiably, of a lack of manpower. 153 However, the ingrained,
habits of 38,000 jurisdictions-including a belief by many
that they did not discriminate-and the ORS' view that its
primary mission was to pay out money constituted the core of
the problem. Both phenomena were, of course, closely linked
to the program's underlying premises.
4. Formula Issues-Did the Act put the Money Where the
Needs Were?
In 1975 Senator Edmund Muskie predicted "rough sled-
ding" for the renewal of Revenue Sharing and emphasized
the desirability of rewriting the distribution formula in order
to channel funds to those jurisdictions with greatest needs. 5 4
Thirty-eight thousand jurisdictions were receiving funds.
Congressmen and other policymakers learned the identity of
the beneficiaries under the existing formula and developed
ideas for possible changes.
The principal issue was whether the 1972 formula was suc-
cessful in matching federal resources to state and local needs.
A grant distribution formula may utilize measures of need for
a particular aid program (e.g., counting the number of poor
children in distributing education funds), or may attempt to
reflect differentials in recipients' fiscal capacity (e.g., allocat-
ing distributions inversely with per capita income). 155 The
latter approach is generally referred to as "equalization." The
1972 formula attempted to measure program need through
152 Id. at 90, 94, 95 (supplemental views of Rep. Drinan).
153 See generally SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 8-9.
154 Muskie,Revenue Sharing and Counter-CyclicalAssistance, REVENUE SnARING
AND DECENTRALIZATION 68, 70 (N. Scheffer ed. 1975).
155 See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1005-21.
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such factors as population and urbanized population, and also
attempted to equalize for fiscal capacity differences through
the use of income factors. The formula's attempt, through a
"tax effort" factor to reward those jurisdictions which were ac-
tually using their capacity, seemed closely allied to equaliza-
tion goals.
Analysis of the Revenue Sharing formula must consider
both how it distributed funds among states, and how these
funds were, in turn, distributed to local governments within
states. The Brookings study concluded that, on an interstate
level, the formula succeeded in targeting funds to "low-
capacity, high-effort states," but did not succeed in helping
the highly urbanized states.15 6 As for the intra-state distribu-
tion to localities, Brookings concluded that "large metropoli-
tan central cities" fared reasonably well, but that for other
jurisdictions the conclusion depended on whether Revenue
Sharing was evaluated in isolation, or in comparison with
"the pre-existing financial scale of local government.. .."
Comparative analysis suggested that the formula tended to
benefit "small towns and rural places. '157
Any attempt to change the formula could have, of course,
jeopardized the entire program by splitting the coalition of
states and localities which. initially had secured its enact-
ment. Despite this risk (or perhaps, in some instances because
of it) two principal methods for changing the formula
emerged. The first one suggested that Revenue Sharing go
much further in channeling funds to the large cities.158 Since
large cities have high proportions of service dependent per-
sons, their need for general support funds (the expenditure of
which is likely to assist these persons directly or indirectly) is
greater than their population differential vis 4 vis other com-
munities. This approach led to a search for new measures of
"program need," especially the use of a formula factor which
reflected the number of poor people in ajurisdiction.1 5 9
The Brookings Institution proposed a second method in
156 MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 92.
157 Id. at 132-34.
158 E.g., Reagan, supra note 95, at 29.
159 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 83, 84 (supplemental views of Rep. Fascell).
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light of general criticism that the formula's "equalizing im-
pact is relatively limited. ' 160 Analyses suggested that per
capita income was not an adequate measure of fiscal capacity.
Jurisdictions with relatively low average incomes may have
an abundance of other resources available for taxation. High
per capita income jurisdictions frequently are also urbanized
areas with a bi-modal income distribution-large numbers of
well-off individuals along with large numbers of poor. Thus
Brookings urged the development and utilization of alterna-
tive measures of fiscal capacity in the Revenue Sharing for-
mula.1 61
5. Revenue Sharing as an Inducement to Structural Reform
of Local Government
Some of the earliest Revenue Sharing proposals linked fed-
eral assistance to the "reform" or "modernization" of state
and, especially, local governments. 62 These proposals in-
cluded changes in internal structure to increase accountabil-
ity, fiscal reforms to decrease reliance on "regressive" taxes,
and the creation and strengthening of metropolitan area un-
its. In both its structure and operation, however, the 1972 Act
was generally unreflective of the "reformist" approach. The
major "gain" appears to have been the increased citizen par-
ticipation in some local budgeting processes. 163 Any move-
ment towards "metropolitanism" was blunted in three ways:
first, the Act served to "prop-up" smaller units, reducing in-
centives towards consolidation; second, the A-95 provisions
for review of federally funded local projects by an areawide
"clearing house" do not apply to Revenue Sharing expendi-
tures; and third, regional planning commissions are not able
to directly receive Revenue Sharing funds.16 4
Any federal intervention into the structures and policies of
state and local governments runs counter to the traditional
160 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 162.
161 MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 168.
162 E.g., Humphrey, Foreword to H. REUSS, REVENUE SHARING at xi (1970).
163 See Stenberg, Revenue Sharing and Governmental Reform, 419 ANNALS 55
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Stenberg].
164 Id. at 59-60.
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conception of Revenue Sharing which stresses freedom from all
strings. However, the notion that the national government
should only share revenue with units of government whose
structure and powers corresponded to national standards,
proved to have surprising vitality in 1976.165
C. The Dynamics of the Renewal Amendments-The
Emergence of Interventionist Federalism
When the 1972 Revenue Sharing Act came up for renewal
in 1976 it had the strong support of the Ford Administration,
Republicans in Congress, and organizations of state and local
government officials. At the same time the existing Revenue
Sharing program was subject to mounting criticism from
congressional liberals and civil rights organizations who ar-
gued that revenue sharing failed to aid minorities, the poor
and the aged.166 Only a few congressmen were irrevocably
opposed to renewal in any form, largely on the grounds that
Revenue Sharing constituted an abdication of congressional
sovereignty over national tax revenues.16 7 The Senate was
fairly certain to favor renewal in more or less the 1972 form.
The House Democratic liberals held the balance of power and
faced a choice between attempting to terminate the program
or attempting to restructure it. They chose the latter course,
perhaps out of reluctance to hand the Republicans a major
issue in a presidential election year, perhaps out of recogni-
tion that terminating Revenue Sharing funds would hurt the
large cities most of all.168
Alternatively, these House members may have recognized
the renewal debate as an unusual opportunity to achieve goals
which had hitherto been regarded as impossible-an across the
board change in the nature and activities of American local
governmental units. While any federal grant constitutes in-
tervention into the recipient's operations, if only through low-
165 See 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 17. See text at notes 290-292, infra.
166 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 4-5.
167 E.g., 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 80 (dissenting views of Reps. Brooks and
Moss). These opponents also voiced the "Trojan Horse" view of Revenue Sharing; that
localities would become unduly dependent on the funds.
168 See, e.g., 1976 H. REP., supra note 8, at 87, 88 (supplemental views of Rep.
Conyers).
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ering the "price" to it of engaging in a particular activity, the
renewal of Revenue Sharing presented the possibility of at-
taching strings in order to achieve goals which were only indi-
rectly related to the programs for which the funds were spent.
Such a strategy might be called "interventionist
federalism"-that is, use of the leverage which the grant award
carries with it to achieve a change in the recipient's organiza-
tion or behavior which has substantial effects on matters other
than the specific programs for which the grant funds are ex-
pended. 169 Such intervention might reflect a perceived na-
tional interest in state and local governments' political pro-
cesses, their organization, structure and boundaries, and even
their overall policies and programs. 70
The change in the pattern of federal aid to the states from
categorical grants to block grants and Revenue Sharing may
have enhanced opportunities for interventionist federalism in
two distinct ways: first, recipients may have become depen-
dent upon the flow of funds from block grants and Revenue
Sharing and thus stood in a relatively weak position to re-
sist the imposition of additional strings; 17' second, the na-
tional government could contend that increased deference to
the expenditure choices of state and local governments with
respect to federal funds justified increased federal supervision
of those levels of government. 72
Those House members who favored restructuring the Act
169 This definition would cover effects both within the same overall functional area
as the grant, e.g., "education" and other areas. The concept of interventionist
federalism rests on the possibility of drawing a distinction between strings primarily
related to the purposes behind a particular grant and strings which, while related to
those purposes, reflect other national purposes and attempt to achieve them broadly.
Tb illustrate further, consider the differences between: 1) a prohibition on partisan
political activity by state employees administering a particular grant; 2) a prohibition
on partisan political activity by all state employees working in that grant's functional
area; and 3) a prohibition on partisan political activity by all state employees as a
condition of receiving the grant.
170 Both the concept ofinterventionist federalism and attempts to implement it are
by no means new. See Nathan, supra note 5, at 127-28. The concept can be seen at work
in the numerous federal efforts to encourage metropolitan planning and institutions.
See generally Stenberg, supra note 163, at 51-52.See also NEw FEDERALISM,supra note
18, at 163-64 (concept of "permissive federalism").
171 NEw FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 103-05.
172 Cf. Stolz, supra note 94, at 117-18.
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had four main goals during consideration of the renewal
amendments: strengthening the Act's anti-discrimination
provisions and enforcement mechanism; mandating citizen
participation in Revenue Sharing decisions; forcing greater
expenditures on social services; and, changing the formula,
primarily to aid large cities. They were successful only in the
first two goals. Their successes and failures show the extent to
which the Ninety-fourth Congress was willing to move beyond
the New Federalism's fundamental tenet of taking state and
local governments more or less as they are when entrusting
them with substantial expenditure responsibilities. Congress
accepted the legitimacy of intervention, through the grant
device, to ensure that the rules of the allocation "game" at the
sub-national level are fair and that no groups are excluded
from playing, but de-emphasized direct national influence over
the outcome of that game, except discriminatory outcomes.
D. The Renewal Amendments
Late in the 1976 session, after protracted legislative ma-
neuvering, Congress enacted the State and Local Fiscal Assis-
tance Amendments of 1976.173 Revenue Sharing was renewed
for three and three-quarters years at an annual funding level
of $6.85 billion. Although one report states that the amend-
ments reflected a "status quo position," 17 4 the changes
enacted could have a potentially sweeping effect on recipient
governments.
1. The Anti-discrimination P5rovisions
There are three significant aspects of the new section 122.
First, the grounds of prohibited discrimination are broadened
to include age, handicapped status and religion. 175 The hand-
icapped provision could be of particular significance, if the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare attacks such
forms of discrimination aggressively. 176
173 Revenue Sharing Amendment, supra note 7.
174 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 23.
175 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
176 See Statement of Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr. (April 28,1977) (on file with
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The second significant change attempts to prevent fungible
expenditure of Revenue Sharing funds from hiding dis-
criminatory practices. Under the old Act, recipients who were
engaging even in overt discriminatory practices would appar-
ently suffer no loss of Revenue Sharing funds unless the dis-
crimination emanated from a program or activity directly
funded with Revenue Sharing money.1 77 During the renewal
debate, liberals led by Rep. Robert Drinan proposed a ban on
all discriminatory practice by recipients, regardless of
whether Revenue Sharing funds were involved.178 The final
version of section 122(a)(1) does, on its face, bar discrimina-
tion in "any program or activity of a [recipient] ... ." But, sec-
tion 122(a)(2) allows recipients to avoid the Act's sanctions if,
in administrative proceedings, they can demonstrate "by clear
and convincing evidence that the program or activity with re-
spect to which the allegation of discrimination has been made
is not funded in whole or in part with [Revenue Sharing]
funds .. ,,179 While arguably this clause reintroduces the fun-
gibility problem by exempting discriminatory activities fi-
nanced with freed-up funds, 80 the amendments at least ap-
pear to alter the burden of proof with respect to use of Reve-
nue Sharing funds in discriminatory practices, and suggest
that the mere filing of a use report will not satisfy that bur-
den.
The third change is a direct attack on ORS' alleged "laxity"
in enforcement of anti-discrimination provisions. There was
wide agreement on the need to "send the Office of Revenue
Sharing a message" on enforcement practices. 18' The amend-
ments mandate precise procedures and specific time limits
within which the ORS (technically, the Secretary of the
the author). Even if the O.R.S. does not interpret this guarantee as broadly as H.E.W.,
O.R.S. could still find itself obliged to enforce H.E.W. "holdings" of discrimination
based on handicapped status. See text accompanying notes 181-184 infra.
177 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 122(a). See 1976 H. REP., supra note 144,
at 12. But see SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 8 (revised enforcement policy under old
Act in area of employment discrimination).
178 H.R. 8329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 10, 122 (1975).
179 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
180 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 167-68.
181 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 108, 111 (supplemental views of Rep. Horton).
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Treasury who delegated his authority to the ORS) must carry
those procedures out.182 The key elements of the new en-
forcement provisions are two "trigger mechanisms" which are
intended to force the ORS to begin the compliance proceedings
outlined below. The triggers are either a "holding" by a fed-
eral or state court or a federal administrative law judge that a
recipient government has engaged in discrimination as de-
fined by the Act, or a "finding" by the ORS that "it is more
likely than not" that a recipient is discriminating. 183 There
are two important restrictions on the ORS' discretion. First,
it must accept the "holding" that a discriminatory practice has
occurred, unless that "holding" is reversed by an appellate
tribunal, presumably in the process of appeal from the origi-
nal proceeding which led to the "holding." Second, the Office
is not free to delay its own "findings" through inaction on
complaints. Section 125 is a new provision (discussed more
fully below) which requires the ORS to establish time limits,
not to exceed 90 days, for investigation and initial resolution
of discrimination complaints.
Either trigger-a "holding" or a "finding"-sets off admin-
istrative proceedings which can lead to suspension or termi-
nation of Revenue Sharing payments. The ORS sends the re-
cipient a "notice of noncompliance" within 10 days of the trig-
ger, and the recipient has 30 days to respond. If the recipient
contests the issue, it may "informally present evidence" to the
ORS in support of its position. At this point the distinction be-
tween a "holding" and a "finding" is critical. A recipient may
not collaterally attack a "holding" of discrimination, but can
only attempt to prove that Revenue Sharing funds are not in-
volved. However, an ORS "finding" of discrimination is sub-
ject to full re-examination in this informal proceeding. Within
this 30-day period the Office must either (1) secure a "com-
pliance agreement," (2) make a "determination" of compliance
or (3) make a "determination" of non-compliance. Either of
the first two results appears to end the matter, subject to judi-
182 As a matter of convenience, this Article will use "O.R.S." instead of the
"Secretary of Treasury" when speaking of the administration of Revenue Sharing.
183 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1242(b)(1), 1242(c)(1) & 1242(c)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
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cial challenge by a third party.184 "Determination!' of non-
compliance requires the office to suspend funding within 10
days. At this point the recipient may either enter into a com-
pliance agreement or challenge the "determination."
Any such challenge, which blocks the suspension, takes the
form of a "hearing" before an administrative law judge. Sec-
tion 122 does not specifically invoke the adjudication pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). However,
in view of that section's reference to a "record," and the pro-
visions of section 143 for review on the record in a Court of
Appeals, use of the adjudication provisions may be mandat-
ory.' 8 5 In any event, the Office of Revenue Sharing's new
Regulations incorporate the key APA procedures.' 86 The
hearing can result either in exoneration, a compliance agree-
ment, suspension, or termination. Suspension can be lifted
more easily than termination, which requires reversal of the
administrative law judge by an appellate tribunal. 18 7 Both
suspension and termination are subject to judicial review at
the circuit court level under section 143.188
Although it is not as stringent as some reformers wished,
the new section 122 reflects interventionist goals. It has the
potential to alter widespread local government practices,
especially employment practices which may not violate con-
stitutional standards of non-discrimination. 189 It could also
have an effect on the provision of services.
184 Any such suit would be brought in accordance with the new § 124.
185 But see United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
186 31 C.F.R. §§ 51.50-51.62 (1977).
187 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(e)-(f) (West Supp. 1977).
188 31 U.S.C.A. § 1263(a) (West Supp. 1977). It is interesting to note that a
"holding" of discrimination, which triggers O.R.S. proceedings, cannot be attacked
collaterally in those proceedings. § 122(c)(2). This provision could cause interagency
difficulties if O.R.S. disagreed with H.E.W.'s interpretation of anti-discrimination
statutes under its jurisdiction and incorporated into § 122(a). Section 122(h) authorizes
cooperative agreements between the Secretary of Treasury and other federal and state
agencies for joint investigations and notification to the Secretary of "any actions
instituted by such agencies against a state government or a unit of local government
alleging a violation of any federal civil rights statute or regulations issued
thereunder." However, a decision by a state agency is not a holding as § 122 uses
that term. Such a provision was deleted during the legislative process.
189 See 6 Revenue Sharing Bull., No. 3, at 1 (Jan. 1978) (increased volume of cases
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Section 122's actual impact will depend, of course, on
whether the Office of Revenue Sharing zealously enforces the
new provisions. The interim regulations set forth broad pro-
hibitions on employment discrimination, including conduct
"perpetuating the results of past discriminatory practices."' 90
Anti-discrimination enforcement appears to be much more
vigorous than in the past. According to one analysis,
state and local governments are realizing that merely
eliminating any intentional discrimination against
women and minorities is no longer sufficient to comply
with the nondiscrimination provisions of the Revenue
Sharing Act. Discrimination today is measured by 'ef-
fects' as well as 'intent,' and to simply prohibit discrimi-
nation is not enough to secure equal employment
opportunities-a prerequisite for not losing revenue shar-
ing funds. 191
It is not clear whether a Revenue Sharing recipient could
claim an exemption from the anti-discrimination provisions if
the only department which utilized Revenue Sharing funds
was in compliance with affirmative action standards while
the recipient's overall employment pattern was not. The ORS
appears to take the position that as long as Revenue Sharing
funds go to pay any salary, the recipient's overall employment
of personnel is a funded "program or activity" and thus must,
as a whole, be in compliance with the anti-discrimination pro-
visions. 19 2
enforcing anti-discrimination provisions). Section 122 does not stand alone, of course.
The same goals are furthered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (42 U.S.C. §
2000e(a) (Supp. IV 1974).See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Title
VII is within the regulatory power of Congress). Thus it might seem unnecessary to
utilize the interventionist approach in order to achieve broad changes in state and local
employment practices. However, the sanctions available under the Revenue Sharing
Act may be more effective than those available under Title VII. Cf. MICHELMAN &
SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 1083.
190 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(2)(ii) (1977).
191 5 Revenue Sharing Bull., No. 11, at 3 (Sept. 1977); see 5 Revenue Sharing Bull.,
No. 8, at 1 (June 1977) ("Recipients in trouble over nondiscrimination provisions") 6
Revenue Sharing Bull., No. 8, at 1 (Dec. 1977) ("More recipients in violation of civil
rights requirements").
192 But cf. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (1968) (narrow
interpretation of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964). Even under Revenue Sharing
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2. The Citizen Participation Provisions
As with the non-discrimination amendments, the question
was not whether Congress would enact citizen participation
requirements, but how extensive they would be. Liberal cri-
tics of the 1972 Act's operation felt that opening up the
budgetary process was the key to changing local political sys-
tems. The question was what mechanism to use.
The most sweeping proposals for change were contained in
Congressman Drinan's bill, H.R. 8329. At.the local level, it
mandated "a series of public hearings" prior to adoption of
a planned use report, and appointment of a broadly based
"tcitizens advisory committee" to oversee and recommend the
expenditure of Revenue Sharing funds. 193 Large local
governments-defined, essentially, as those that received
more than one million dollars annually-would have to "pro-
vide for the selection and appointment of a local citizen's ad-
vocate .. ." with general supervisory authority over Revenue
Sharing funds, and the ability to conduct "investigations, au-
.dits, and studies .... "194 As for all other local governmental
units, each state would have to establish "an office of citizen
advocacy, which shall perform, to the extent possible and feas-
ible, the function of citizen advocate .... 195 The local "citizens'
advocate" proposal, which seems a cross between an
ombudsman-watchdog and a shadow government, may well
mark the outer boundary of suggested federal intervention
into local governmental structures through grant program
strings.
The final legislation relies essentially on the public hearing
as the mechanism for citizen participation. Two hearings are
required. The first is held by the governmental authority re-
sponsible for preparing the budget and deals with "possible
uses" of Revenue Sharing funds. 96 The second hearing is to be
there would remain the hypothetical possibility of a recipient which applied all its
funds to uses, such as capital expenditures, which did not involve the payment of
salaries, thus exempting its employment practices from § 122.
193 H.R. 8329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1975).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 31 U.S.C.A. § 1241(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
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held by the governmental entity which enacts the budget. The
"budget hearing" is not limited solely to consideration of Rev-
enue Sharing funds but must include the opportunity "to ask
questions concerning the entire budget and the relation
thereto of [Revenue Sharing] funds...."9 Congress' concern
with who participates in subnational political processes-in
addition to the openness of those processes-was underscored
by a provision requiring recipients to take steps to ensure par-
ticipation in budget hearings by senior citizens.198 Although
the amendments do not compel state and local governments to
follow suggestions made by citizens, the Brookings Institution
concluded that "the hearing requirements could have an im-
portant effect on state and local political processes."'199 Such
an impact would represent a victory for interventionist
federalism.
However, the implementation activities of the ORS will
again play a crucial role in determining just how significant
this effect is. The Amendments authorize the ORS to promul-
gate regulations waiving both hearings. The proposed use
hearing may be waived "if the cost of such a requirement
would be unreasonably burdensome in relation to the [reci-
pient's] entitlement ... .,,200 The budget hearing may be
waived if "the budget processes required under applicable
state or local law or charter provisions assure the opportunity
for public attendance and participation... and a portion of
such process includes a hearing on the proposed use of [Re-
venue Sharing] funds in relation to its entire budget. ' 201
On January 10, 1977, the ORS promulgated "Interim Regu-
lations" which appeared to reflect a policy of "granting exten-
sive waivers of the hearing requirements. '20 2 The regulations
eliminated the proposed use hearing for four classes of reci-
197 Id. § 1241(b)(2).
198 Id. § 1241(g).
199 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 168.
200 31 U.S.C.A. § 1241(b)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
201 Id.
202 42 Fed. Reg. 2196 (Jan. 10, 1977). The assessment of the policy is taken from
SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 168, and refers to the initial "proposed regulations"
issued in October of 1976.
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pients: governments (such as the commission form) for which
a budget is not presented by an executive authority to a legis-
lative body; governments receiving less than $10,000 annu-
ally in Revenue Sharing funds; governments for which the
unavoidable expense of holding the hearing would exceed 5
percent of their Revenue Sharing funds; and, governments
which provide more feasible and less costly "alternative
means of public participation. '20 3 The budget hearing was
waived for those recipients who were not required under ap-
plicable law to enact a single budget or to adopt a formal
budget, provided that alternative means of public participa-
tion in the budget process were available. 20 4
In response to highly critical public comment, the ORS has
backtracked substantially on waiving the hearing require-
ments.20 5 New "proposed regulations" delete all exemptions
from the proposed use hearing except exemption based on un-
avoidable expense. The ORS may grant a waiver if "unavoid-
able" hearing expenses exceed 15 percent of Revenue Sharing
funds. 20 6 The exemption from the budget hearing is deleted,
although the proposed regulations do contemplate permitting
utilization of "an alternative budget hearing process." 20 7
These changes will have a substantial impact. For example,
the Revenue Sharing Bulletin, which originally estimated
that the first ORS proposals would exempt up to 75 percent of
local governments below the county level from proposed use
hearings, now reports that "virtually all governments will be
required to hold proposed use hearings .... )20 8
3. The Citizen Complaint Provision 209
The amendments concerning non-discrimination and citi-
203 Proposed 31 C.F.R. § 51.13, 42 Fed. Reg. 2197 (Jan. 10, 1977).
204 Proposed 31 C.F.R. § 51.14, 42 Fed. Reg. 2197-98 (Jan. 10, 1977).
205 See 42 Fed. Reg. 34336 (July 5, 1977).
206 Proposed 31 C.F.R. § 51.13, 42 Fed. Reg. 34236-37 (July 5, 1977).
207 Proposed 31 C.F.R. § 51.14(e), 42 Fed. Reg. 34337 (July 5, 1977). The provision
permitting the budget hearing to be held before a committee of the enacting body is
retained.
208 5 Revenue Sharing Bull. No. 9, at 1 (July 1977).
209 For a general discussion of the role of citizen complaints in grant enforcement,
see Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 35, at 637-38.
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zen participation add substantial strings to the original Reve-
nue Sharing program. New strings, of course, raise the ques-
tion of whether the existing control mechanisms are
adequate. In the case of most grant programs, Congress would
probably rely almost exclusively on enforcement by the gran-
tor agency, through its periodic "plan" reviews and other
oversight activities. However, Congress took a different ap-
proach with Revenue Sharing by relying on citizen impetus as
a primary means of setting the administrative controls into
motion.210
There are two reasons for this departure. First, Revenue
Sharing is different from other grant programs in that it con-
tains no plan approval mechanism. The legislative history of
the renewal amendments shows a second reason for Congress'
different approach: lack of confidence in the Office of Revenue
Sharing's willingness to enforce strings against state and local
governments. In a sense, the ORS found itself subject to the
same criticism levelled against many regulatory agencies. Cri-
tics argued that since the agency was "too close" to, and in
sympathy with, those it was supposed to regulate, the adminis-
trative process had to be opened up to tprivate attorneys gen-
eral. '211 Most of the criticism focused on the Office of Revenue
Sharing's handling of discrimination complaints; and the legis-
lative history suggests that Congress regarded the new citizen
complaint provision as part of the strengthened anti-
discrimination mechanism. 212
The new section 125 ("Investigations and Compliance Re-
views") covers any "possible violation of the provisions of [the]
Act." The key provision is a requirement that ORS promul-
gate regulations (by March 31, 1977) establishing "reasonable
and specific time limits (in no event to exceed 90 days)"
within which it shall conduct an investigation and "make a
finding" after receiving a citizen complaint.213 Although the
Act retains requirements for notice and hearing prior to the
210 E.g., §§ 121, 125.
211 See generally Stewart, supra note 44, at 1682-83.
212 E.g., 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 14-15.
213 31 U.S.C.A. § 1245 (West Supp. 1977). The same time limits apply to receipt of
other information concerning violations of the Act, including determinations by state
and local agencies. Section 125 also contemplates that the Secretary of the Treasury
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imposition of sanctions, the amendments do not specify
whether sanctions are to be imposed if the investigation leads
to a finding of violation.214 But the regulations resolve this
dilemma by guaranteeing a "finding" within 90 days of the
filing of a formal administrative complaint of any violation of
the Act, and by treating this finding as a trigger mechanism for
adjudicatory procedures which must be followed prior to impo-
sition of any sanction. 215 These procedures take the form of a
complaint against the recipient, filed and prosecuted by the
ORS before an administrative lawjudge, who conducts a "hear-
ing... pursuant to section 7 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. 556)."216 Either party may appeal the adminis-
trative law judge's decision to the Secretary of the Treasury,
and the Secretary's decision (or the administrative law
judge's, if not appealed) is then subject to judicial review by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. 217
will conduct his own audits and compliance reviews, and requires him to establish time
limits for these activities, without specifying a maximum period. Apparently, such
reviews can be triggered by "allegations" of violation, which are less formal than the
"complaints" which trigger 90-day investigations.
214 Section 123(b) presents an interesting ambiguity. Apart from the
anti-discrimination provisions, it is now the only authority for the Secretary to with.
hold payments. Presumably the Secretary can withhold if recipients violate any
assurances made of compliance with strings, as well as for failure to make them.
Otherwise, the assurances requirement and the sanction to enforce it would be
meaningless. However, the statutory grounds for withholding do not, apart from
§ 122, extend to all violations of the Act, but only the assurances requirement of
§ 123(b) and regulations "prescribed thereunder." Yet the regulations state that
the sanctions process will be triggered "whenever the Director has reason to believe
that a recipient government has failed to comply with any section of the Act. .. ." 31
C.F.R. § 51.02 (1977) (emphasis supplied). It appears that Congress failed to specify
that funds could be withheld for violation of the citizen participation requirements. See
e.g., Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 104(b).
215 31 C.F.R. 99 51.3(b), 51.200-23 (1977).
216 31 C.F.R. § 51.212 (1977).
217 31 C.F.R. 99 221-22,225 (1977). Although the administrative action would then
be "final," the regulations track § 123(b) in providing for a 60-day grace period
for the recipient to take "corrective action" before funds are withheld. 31 C.F.R. §
51.3(b). The sanctions provisions of the regulations appear to limit the administrative
law judges to imposing penalties commensurate with the amount of Revenue Sharing
funds expended in violation of the Act. 31 C.F.R. 51.218(a)-(c) is specific on this point.
Subsection (d) refers to a reduction in entitlement, without specifying how it is to be
computed. In the case of an across-the-board violation, such as failure to follow the
citizen participation provisions, the proper penalty would presumably be the
Revenue Sharing
The renewal amendments and implementing regulations
will generate a substantial volume of enforcement activity.218
Much of this activity will stem from citizen complaints alleg-
ing violations of the Act, including the anti-discrimination
provisions. The Act is not clear on the role, if any, of the citi-
zen complainant after a finding of violation has been made.
Neither the Act nor the regulations provide for third party in-
tervention in the adjudicatory proceedings before an adminis-
trative law judge, which must take place prior to imposition of
any penalty to remedy a violation.
At the very least, the original complainant appears to have
a right under section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act to "appear" in the proceeding before the administrative law
judge. Moreover, the complainant may well have a right to
intervene under decisions such as National Welfare Rights
Organization v. Finch2 19 and Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.220 To the extent that the
right of intervention in administrative proceedings is coexten-
sive with standing to seek judicial review of those proceedings,
the argument for intervention is bolstered by the Renewal
Amendment's provision for judicial review in federal or state
court by any "person aggrieved."2 21 To the extent that the
criterion should be "the contribution that a prospective inter-
vener can make... ,,222 local residents may have both greater
knowledge and motivation than the enforcement agency. Cer-
tainly, allowing intervention furthers Congress' obvious inten-
tion to rely heavily on citizen enforcement of the Revenue
Sharing Act's strings.
withholding of all payments. 31 C.F.R. § 51.3(b) so provides specifically, although it
refers to the Director (of O.R.S.) imposing this sanction rather than to the judge or
Secretary. It is important to note that the regulations permit the administrative law
judge to order repayment of Revenue Sharing funds, even though the only explicit
statutory provision contemplating repayment (the former § 123(a)(3)) was
repealed. Cf. Susskind, supra note 20, at 95.
218 See, e.g., 5 Revenue Sharing Bull. No. 10, at I (August 1977).
219 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
220 359 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention
before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REv. 726, 766 (1968) (difference
between "appearance" and intervention).
221 See GELLHORN & BYSE, supia note 53,-at 723-26.
222 Shapiro, supra note 220, at 767.
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The Act and its amendments also do not indicate to what
extent the ORS in the complaint process is to get involved in
overseeing state and local government activities. Complaints
under section 125 can relate to any "possible violation of the
provisions of [the Act]. .. ." Complaints can include alleged
violations of "the laws and procedures applicable to the ex-
penditure of [the recipient's] own revenues... ." Thus, the ORS
may be forced to investigate and resolve essentially state law
questions. There is a large volume of state court litigation in-
volving issues such as the violation of competitive bidding 223
and conflict of interest statutes.224 If the volume of complaints
becomes too great, or if experience suggests that the ORS has
little to contribute to such issues, it might be desirable for fu-
ture amendments to limit the complaint mechanism to viola-
tion of provisions such as anti-discrimination and citizen par-
ticipation sections in which there is a strong federal inter-
est.
Imposing the requirement that federal administrative pro-
cedures be exhausted before state proceedings can be com-
menced is troublesome as well. Supported by the doctrine of
Testa v. Katt,225 Congress may have the power to compel state
courts to hear Revenue Sharing claims and to require exhaus-
tion of a federal administrative remedy beforehand. 226 Again,
however, if the claim is based upon the state's own "laws and
procedures," it is not clear that the administrative proceed-
ings would be of much assistance to the state court. And if fed-
eral adjudicatory proceedings have led to a finding in the
grantee's favor, it is difficult to predict how subsequent state
judicial proceedings will weigh the finding.227 Omitting ques-
tions of state "laws and procedures" from the complaint
mechanism would also remove the exhaustion requirement
223 E.g., McMichael v. Van Ho, 8 Ohio Misc. 281, 219 N.E.2d 831 (1966).
224 E.g., Conley v. Town of Ipswich, 352 Mass. 201, 224 N.E.2d 411 (1967).
225 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
226 See generally P. BATOR, P.,'MIsHYIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 567-71 (2d ed. 1973).
227 Cf. id. at 429-31. Since the Revenue Sharing statute has, in effect,
"incorporated" state law, state decisions on "laws and procedures" would presumably
be authoritative.
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affecting such disputes. This is probably a desirable result.
4. The Citizen Suit Provision
Congress' intention to rely on citizen enforcement of the
Revenue Sharing Act's strings is also clearly visible in the re-
newal legislation's provision for citizen suits. A new section
124 provides that "whenever a State government or a unit of
local government, or any officer or employee thereof acting in
an official capacity, has engaged or is engaging in any act or
practice prohibited by this chapter, upon exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, a civil action may be instituted by the
person aggrieved in an appropriate United States district court
or in a State court of general jurisdiction. '228
This remarkable provision for a general "citizen suit"
sparked little opposition, or even interest during the 1976
legislative debate. The original Act generated a substantial
volume of litigation between its enactment and 1976. Many
congressmen, including members of the House committee
with jurisdiction over the bill, read the cases to support the
proposition that courts would entertain suits to remedy
violations of the Act's strings.229 However, a closer analysis of
the cases decided under the old Act reveals that this was not
entirely true and that the availability of a judicial forum
might depend on the violation asserted.
In one category of classes the situation was relatively clear:
victims of discriminatory practices by recipients could bring
suit in federal district court.230 The jurisdictional and reme-
dial statutes concerning civil rights actions facilitated suits
against recipients,231 while suits against the ORS could be
brought in any circuit where section 702 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act was viewed as a general grant of jurisdic-
tion.232 Major procedural issues remained unresolved, includ-
ing the extent to which a complainant had to exhaust any
228 31 U.S.C.A. § 1244(a) (West Supp. 1977).
229 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 30.
230 E.g., Johnson v. City of Greenwood, Civ. No. GC-75-131-K (N.D. Miss. 1975).
231 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970).
232 Robinson v. Schulz, Civ. No. 74-248 (D.D.C. 1974).
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available remedies with the ORS before suing,233 and whether
the grantee was an indispensable party in a suit against the
ORS. 234 Standing was also a potential obstacle in non-
discrimination suits. 235
Litigants also had little difficulty initiating proceedings
against recipients in state courts to restrain violations of the
Act's program expenditure strings and fiduciary-
administrative strings. 236 This result simply may have been
an application of the principles of Testa v. Katt concerning
state courts' obligations to enforce federal law.237
At the point of the renewal debate, the major unresolved
question was whether the federal courts were open to plain-
tiffs alleging violations of the Act other than discriminatory
practices. Such suits probably could have been brought
against the ORS under general principles of third party chal-
lenges to administrative action. 238 In the case of third party
suits against the grantee, the federal courts were split. The
Seventh Circuit's decision in Schreiber v. Lugar raised two
major obstacles for any third party plaintiffs.239 First, the
plaintiff must satisfy the $10,000 amount in controversy re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. section 1331. In Schreiber, a challenge
to a $4.4 million expenditure for a sports facility, Judge (now
Justice) Stevens held that the amount had to be computed
from the point of view of an individual plaintiffs own dam-
ages, that claims could not be aggregated, and that based on
those criteria no single plaintiff met the $10,000 require-
ment.240 A second potential obstacle alluded to but not re-
solved was whether any cause of action in favor of third par-
ties against grantees could be implied from the Revenue Shar-
ing Act at all.241
233 Taylor, Sklar & Zehner, Legal Issues in Revenue Sharing, 7 NAT'L CL'H'S FOR
LEGAL SERV., CL'H'SE REV., 18, 19 (1974).
234 See United States v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd 549
F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
235 See Committee for Full Employment v. Simon, Civ. No. 76-0467 (D.D.C. 1976).
236 E.g., Mackey v. McDonald, 255 Ark. 978, 504 S.W.2d 726 (1974).
237 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
238 See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
239 518 F.2d 1099 (7th Cir. 1975).
240 Id. at 1101-04.
241 Id. at 1104-05, n. 16. See, Michigan Dist. Council No. 77 ofA.F.S.C.M.E. v. City
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If Schreiber represents the prevailing view under the old
Act, the renewal amendments expand greatly the availability
of judicial controls to ensure grantee observance of program
strings. Section 124 appears to constitute both the establish-
ment of a "right of action" and an exemption from the $10,000
jurisdictional amount.242 The Senate and House were initially
split over whether a citizen suit should be limited to violations
of the non-discrimination provisions. The Senate's position was
that the suits should be limited in this fashion. 243 The House
bill originally reported by the Committee on Government Op-
erations made no provision for citizen suits because the Com-
mittee assumed they were already authorized. 244 Those Com-
mittee members who recognized that Schreiber might be a
problem dealt with it by "disapproving" the opinion in a foot-
note.245 The House Committee did provide for attorneys' fees
and intervention by the United States Attorney General in
private civil actions. Section 124 became part of the House bill
when the full House reversed the Committee and substituted
for its reported bill the legislation first reported by the Sub-
committee on Intergovernmental Relations.2 46
Apart from removing any jurisdictional and right of action
obstacles to a citizen suit, section 124 is important in two re-
spects. First, it clarifies the exhaustion issue by requiring
"exhaustion of administrative remedies," and "deeming"
them to be exhausted 90 days after filing a complaint with the
ORS unless the matter is resolved, at least initially, in the
complainant's favor.247 Second, section 124(e) authorizes the
court to award attorneys' fees.248
of Detroit, 436 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (no implied cause of action under Public
Works Employment Act).
242 At times, Congress has provided specifically for citizen suits "without regard to
the amount in controversy." 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h) (2) (Supp. 1976) (Clean Air Act).
243 S. REP. No. 94-1207,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5151, 5153.
244 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 14, 102.
245 Id. at 102 n.2 (additional views of Rep. Drinan).
246 122 CONG. REc. H5634 (daily ed. June 10, 1976).
247 31 U.S.C.A. § 1244(d) (West Supp. 1977).
248 Id. § 1244(e). See Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. , 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). The Attorney General is also authorized to
intervene in Revenue Sharing citizen suits.
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Despite the apparent simplicity of section 124, the provision
raises a number of potentially complex procedural and related
issues which will be briefly reviewed here in the context of
suits in federal court.
a. Standing
By limiting standing under section 124 to any "person ag-
grieved" by violations of the Act, Congress seems to have
avoided any constitutional prohibitions against grantors'
standing and spared courts the task of applying the "zone of
interests" test.249 Even so, courts will be confronted with some
difficult standing issues.
The standing of municipal and state taxpayers to bring sec-
tion 124 challenges against federal Revenue Sharing is par-
ticularly likely to pose problems. In an analogous context, at
least one federal district court has held that municipal tax-
payers do not have standing to challenge grant awards.250
Since Revenue Sharing funds are not local tax revenue but
federal receipts, a literal reading of Frothingham v. Mellon
might suggest a denial of standing.251 On the other hand, il-
legal use of Revenue Sharing funds can affect local taxes by
diverting the funds away from other uses which might reduce
those taxes, or be of greater benefit to taxpayers, and might
lead to the loss of future Revenue Sharing funds.252 Thus, the
case for taxpayer standing to challenge Revenue Sharing ex-
penditures seems fairly strong. But it is not clear whether
local taxpayer standing, if allowed, would extend to violations
of the Act other than expenditures, such as inadequate citizen
participation. Such a suit might not be viewed as a "good
faith" pocketbook action.253 The taxpayer could frame a com-
249 See, Rhode Island Comm. v. General Serv. Admin. 561 F.2d 397 (1st Cir. 1977)
(denying standing to plaintiffs not within the "zone of interests").
250 Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975).
251 262 U.S. 447 (1923). However, the Court did state that "the interest of a
taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its moneys is direct and immediate and
the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate." Id. at 486
(emphasis supplied).
252 See Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (emphasizing
provision for repayment of 110% of certain illegal expenditures). Predicating standing
on the danger of any administrative sanction may be somewhat tautological. No citizen
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plaint about insufficient participation in adopting the budget
as a challenge to all expenditures of Revenue Sharing funds.
Additional standing problems might include whether other
jurisdictions or their residents can challenge a recipient's use
of funds.
b. Suits Against the ORS
Since section 124(a) only refers to illegal acts by recipients
and their officials, one might infer that suit can only be
brought against them, and not against the ORS. However,
section 124(e) does provide that the United States shall be
liable for fees and costs, indicating that suit can be brought
against the ORS.254 General "federal question" jurisdiction
would presumably remain available to support a suit against
the agency. Thus third parties now have the option in federal
courts of suing either the grantee or the ORS. If they choose the
latter course, the question arises whether the grantee is an
"indispensable party." The question has a good deal of practical
significance, since the answer may determine whether suit can
be brought in the District of Columbia federal courts, or only in
districts where the grantee can be joined. The grantee may be a
person who "claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest . ,,."255 The grantee certainly has a
vital stake in the proceedings and it may be in a better position
to argue about local facts and circumstances than is the ORS.
suit can be brought until administrative remedies within the O.R.S. have been
exhausted. However, that agency would have vindicated the grantee--otherwise there
would be no suit-thus, apparently, eliminating the risk of any sanction concerning
the violation in question.
253 See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
254 The matter is not clear. Attorney fees are only awarded in Section 122 suits, and
the Attorney General may intervene in such cases. Congress may not have intended to
have one branch of the federal government suing another. Furthermore, Section 124
allows attorney fees to a prevailingparty, notjust a prevailing plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C.A
§ 3766(c)(4)(A) & (B) (West Supp. 1977). Perhaps this language contemplates awarding
fees to the grantee, and makes the United States liable if it intervenes. Whatever the
ambiguities, it is doubtful that Congress intended to take away, by Section 124, the
right of third parties to sue the O.R.S.
255 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
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The district court's opinion in United States v. City of Chicago, a
decision which pre-dates section 124, accepts this analysis,
even though it did not apply it in the complicated fact situation
presented.256 On the other hand, it would appear that the ORS
is not an indispensable party in a section 124 suit against the
grantee, since injunctive relief against the recipient would be
effective in bringing its violations to an end.25"
c. Suit in District Court as Review of Administrative Action
or De Novo Proceeding?
Section 124 raises a basic insitutional question of whether a
court should merely review the ORS' response to the com-
plaint, or whether it should play an independent role in re-
solving disputes between citizens and their governments.25 8
Section 124 can be interpreted to support both roles. It does
not refer to a citizen suit as an "action to review" administra-
tive proceedings, but it does require "exhaustion" of adminis-
trative remedies. A broadly interventionist view of that sec-
tion would lead to the conclusion that Congress meant to give
disgruntled citizens a maximum number of opportunities to
challenge local decisions. On the other hand, reading sections
124 and 125 together suggests that Congress intended to give
those who might be excluded at the state or local levels one set
of federal remedies: guaranteed access to an administrative
forum, with judicial review available as a check to ensure that
the grantor agency was not "captured" by the grantees.
Under the 1976 amendments federal jurisdiction to review
Revenue Sharing compliance disputes will be split between
the district courts and courts of appeal depending on who in-
itiates judicial action. If the outcome of administrative pro-
ceedings is adverse to the grantee, section 143 permits it to
seek "on the record" review at the circuit court level. If, how-
ever, the grantee wins at the administrative level, the third
party complainant who initiated the administrative proceed-
256 395 F. Supp. 329, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
257 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 428 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring).
258 See Stewart, supra note 44, at 1756 n. 412.
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ings would have to sue in district court under section 124. Al-
though this division of "review" may be an undesirable allo-
cation of judicial resources, 259 it seems inevitable under the
current statute.
For complaints brought in the district court, a question re-
mains as to what effect is to be given to the agency's resolu-
tion of the complaint. The answer should not turn on the iden-
tity of the defendant. If the suit is brought against the ORS,
the court may look to section 706 of the APA,260 but that
provision leaves open the question of when de novo review of
facts is appropriate. Although stating that there is a presump-
tion against de novo review, the Supreme Court in Chandler v.
Roudebush held that federal employee sex discrimination
claims should be tried de novo, after the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies.261 Chandler may govern section 124 proceed-
ings as well. The Court emphasized, for example, that the
private suits in question were not labelled "actions to re-
view."
2 6 2
Another means of determining the proper scope of review in
Revenue Sharing suits against grantees or the ORS would be
to examine how the ORS has proceeded with a case. If the
agency has simply conducted an investigation and made a
"finding" of compliance, de novo review may be appropriate to
ensure at least one full-scale hearing by an entity of the fed-
eral government of the grantee's observance of program
strings. If, however, an initial "finding" of non-compliance
has triggered adjudicatory proceedings which vindicate the
grantee, there seems little reason to give the third party a
broader scope of judicial review than the "on the record" re-
view which would be available to the grantee in a circuit court
if those proceedings had come out the other way.26 3 This con-
259 See generally, Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action:
District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARv. L. REv. 980 (1975).
260 See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889,903 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'd
sub nom. City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977), (en
banc), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 766 (1978).
261 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
262 Id. at 862 n.37.
263 But see id. at 861 (rejection of varying standard in Title VII cases).
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clusion would be strengthened if the third party had had the
opportunity to intervene at the administrative level, since he
would have participated in making the record.
d. State Law Questions in Federal Court
Challenges to local expenditures are frequent in state court
systems. These challenges are based on constitutional re-
quirements such as the "public purpose" doctrine, and the
plethora of state statutes regulating local finance.26 4 Such
matters rarely arise in federal courts.265 However, if a reci-
pient fails to follow the "laws and procedures applicable to the
expenditure of its own revenues," it arguably violates section
123(a)(4).266 If section 123(a)(4) is violated a private civil ac-
tion may be brought to remedy "any act or practice" prohib-
ited by the Revenue Sharing Act.
Given the expertise and availability of state courts, it is
questionable whether federal judicial or administrative re-
sources should be expended to resolve such state law dis-
putes.26 7 On the other hand, federally created "procedures" af-
fecting Revenue Sharing funds, such as the participation pro-
visions, present a stronger case for the availability of a federal
forum. Federal court jurisdiction under section 124 should be
narrowed to allow federal review only where a federally
created interest exists. 268 Such a dichotomy would be consis-
tent with the interventionist interpretation of the amend-
264 E.g., Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 98 A.2d 523 (1953) (public
purpose); Hilliard v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 401, 387 P.2d 536 (1963) (statute
regulating bidding).
265 See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 16, at 110.
266 The argument would be that § 123(a)(4) requires Revenue Sharing recipients
to honor as well as to give assurances that they will comply with the "laws and
procedures applicable to the expenditure of its own revenue."
267 It is possible that federal courts would "abstain" from resolving such disputes
until a state court had resolved any unclear state law questions. See C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL CouRTs 224-27 (3rd ed. 1976).
268 Whether Congress should narrow the scope of federal jurisdiction with respect
to § 124 is a matter of policy rather than constitutional requirements. There
seems to be no bar in Article III to a federal court deciding state law cases involving
Revenue Sharing funds. Thejurisdiction is not merely "protective," since Congress has
created a federal right to have federal funds expended in accordance with state law. See
generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 77-79 (3rd ed. 1976).
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ments, since the federal forum remains available to help bring
about the changes which Congress wished to effectuate.
To summarize, section 124 constitutes a substantial depar-
ture from past congressional practice in the design of grant-
in-aid programs. Potentially, it thrusts the federal courts into
a major role in the enforcement of grant program strings.
Moreover, the provision for a general citizen suit, as well as
the administrative complaint section, strengthens the inter-
ventionist interpretation of the renewal amendments. Con-
gress increased the leverage of those who may be excluded
from the local political processes, by affording them an addi-
tional forum within which to challenge the conduct and the
outcome of those processes. Thus sections 124 and 125 serve
not only as control mechanisms to ensure grantee observance
of program strings, but also as means of redistributing power
at state and local levels.
5. Elimination of the "Priority Categories"
The renewal amendments' major "substantive" change in
the Revenue Sharing program was the elimination of the
"priority expenditure" categories for local governments. Con-
gress incorporated these program expenditure strings into the
original Act in an effort to limit recipient discretion. The in-
clusion of these strings reflected the underlying centralist dis-
trust of decision-making by local governments. At one point
during the renewal process, centralists sought to strengthen
the priority categories by narrowing the eligible activities,
requiring specific percentages of expenditure within these
categories, and making the categories meaningful by requir-
ing that the recipient maintain its own source funding at prior
levels in addition to Revenue Sharing outlays. 26 9 However,
the final amendments simply eliminated the priority expendi-
ture categories. There are at least four reasons why Congress
deleted these categories.
First, decentralists reasoned that imposition of any such
program expenditure strings meant that the program was not
true Revenue Sharing at all. To some extent, the renewal
269 H.R. 8329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1975).
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amendments' legislative history reflects acceptance of this po-
sition.270
A second, though often overlooked reason for eliminating
the categories may have been their adverse effect on Revenue
Sharing funds used for tax relief or tax stabilization. Such
"substitutive" uses were not included as "priority expendi-
tures." In Mathews v. Massell, the court held that Revenue
Sharing funds could not be used to reduce city water rates.2 71
This holding casts doubt on the legality of using such funds for
tax relief or stabilization.27 2 Yet urban spokesmen, such as
Mayor Kenneth Gibson of Newark, insisted that such uses
were the major reason for renewing the program. 273 The issue
was not new, of course. Whether any Revenue Sharing pro-
gram should permit the substitution of federal tax monies for
state and local receipts had been a major controversy since the
1960's.274 The renewal amendments resolve the issue
squarely in favor of allowing Revenue Sharing funds to be
used for tax relief.
Third, all sides could agree to eliminate the categories be-
cause evidence indicated that they were virtually meaning-
less. As the House Committee stated, "since revenue sharing
funds are fungible with other State and local government rev-
enues, it is impossible in many cases to determine for what
purposes the funds are actually being used. '275 Studies by the
Brookings Institution and others had demonstrated the extent
to which the priority categories limitation could be satisfied
by "accounting adjustments," leaving the freed-up funds for
other uses.276
Finally, some legislators supported removal because they
270 See, e.g., Hearings on General Revenue Sharing Before the Subcomm. on
Revenue Sharing of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975)
(statement of Sen. Brock).
271 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
272 See Stolz, supra note 94, at 66-71.
273 State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act: Hearings on H.R. 6558 Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1975).
274 See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 29, at 152.
275 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 9.
276 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 170.
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reasoned that such a move would maximize recipients' discre-
tion over uses of the funds and thus increase their responsibil-
ity to account for those uses. According to this line of reasoning,
the ultimate result is a truer picture of the effect of Revenue
Sharing funds on a locality's budget.277 Removal of the priority
categories might also have been a step toward strengthening
federal leverage over discrimination, since all local expendi-
tures could then be treated as involving Revenue Sharing
funds.278 However, the final language of section 122 reduces
this possibility by permitting a showing that "the program or
activity with respect to which the allegation of discrimination
has been made is not funded in whole or in part with [Revenue
Sharing] funds .... ,,279
Whether the elimination of priority categories will have a
significant effect on the operation of Revenue Sharing is dif-
ficult to predict. This change may increase grantee flexibility.
While there is no doubt that the elimination of priority
categories represents at least a symbolic reduction of federal
intervention, this action may also be viewed as a trade off for
the passage of amendments which were oriented toward in-
terventionist goals.
6. Other Changes
The renewal amendments introduced four other changes in
the program which are potentially significant.
a. Elimination of Anti-Matching Prohibition
The 1972 Act prohibited use of Revenue Sharing funds "as a
contribution for the purpose of obtaining Federal funds under
any law of the Untied States which requires.., a contribution
in order to receive Federal funds." 2 0 Decentralists opposed
the provision with the same philosophical argument they ex-
pressed concerning the priority categories. They maintained
that Revenue Sharing funds were just like local tax receipts,
and therefore should be as freely allocable. The liberal critics
277 Id.
278 Cf. 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 94 (supplemental views of Rep. Drinan).
279 31 U.S.C.A § 1242(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
280 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 104(a), 86 Stat. 920 (1972).
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were troubled by evidence that recipient participation in fed-
eral social programs was the principal casualty of the anti-
matching string. Thus the removal of this unpopular provi-
sion was welcomed by all sides.
b. Reporting Requirements
The renewal amendments continue the Act's requirement
that recipients submit annual use reports to the ORS. 2 1 This
provision may play a key role in the enforcement of the citizen
participation guarantees by the ORS. Section 121(a) requires
that any use report "identify differences between the actual
use of funds received and the proposed use of such funds. '282
Since the recipient must make this report available for public
inspection, the reporting mechanism may provide local citi-
zens' groups with important information on the effect of their
participation in the proposed use hearing and the budget
hearing.28 3
c. Audit Requirements
The original act required the Secretary of the Treasury to
"provide for such accounting and auditing procedures, evalua-
tions and reviews as may be necessary... ." The renewal
amendments go somewhat further in requiring each recipient
to have "an independent audit" every three years, and the
ORS has already issued regulations interpreting this re-
quirement.28 4 This "fiduciary-administrative string" repre-
sents a watered down version of the Hou~e Committee's bill
which included a requirement that audits be made public.285
Even in this form it appears that the new audit requirements
are having a substantial impact on local fiscal practices. One
expert on the operation of the new amendments has stated,
"This provision is causing a major revolution in state-
281 31 U.S.C.A. § 1241(a) (West Supp. 1977).
282 Id.
283 See SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 170-71.
284 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(c)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
285 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 16.
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local finance. The key element is the requirement for an audit
of all the recipient's funds, not just revenue sharing. 286
d. Annual Report to Congress
As discussed above, one technique for legislative oversight
of grantor agency enforcement of program strings is the re-
quirement of specified reports on how a grant program is
operating. The pendency of any such report may also consti-
tute an indirect legislative control over grantees, since they
will be concerned with how Congress perceives their perform-
ance. The 1972 Act required only an annual report on the "op-
eration and status" of the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund dur-
ing the preceding fiscal year.28 7 The renewal amendments
broadened this provision to require an annual report on reci-
pients' observance of the nondiscrimination provisions, their
fiscal practices, and their expenditure of Revenue Sharing
funds.28 One critic was explicit in describing this report as
ttan incentive to the Office of Revenue Sharing to enforce the
provisions of the Act in a timely and forthright manner. '28 9
Since these reports must include recommendations for any
necessary changes in the Act, they are likely to play a key role
when Revenue Sharing is reconsidered by the Ninety-sixth
Congress.
7. The Unsuccessful Amendments
The changes discussed above represent significant victories
for the liberal critics of Revenue Sharing as enacted in 1972.
They were successful in adding new strings on recipients as
well as new federal controls to enforce those strings. However,
the outcome of the renewal debate should not necessarily be
interpreted as a total victory for the centralist approach to
federal grant programs. The defeat of proposals designed to
286 Letter to author from Richard E. Thompson, Executive Director of Revenue
Sharing Advisory Service (February 9, 1978) (on file with author). See 6 Revenue
Sharing Bull. 1 (Nov. 1977) (reporting violations of the new requirements).
287 Revenue Sharing Act, supra note 4, § 105(a)(2).
288 31 U.S.C.A. § 1241(f) (West Supp. 1977).
289 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 94 (supplemental views of Rep. Drinan).
Harvard Journal on Legislation
modernize state and local units and subject Revenue Sharing
to the annual appropriations process shows the continuing
vitality of decentralist values. Moreover, liberal reformers did
not succeed in altering the distribution formula, one of their
principal legislative goals.
a. Proposed "Modernization" of State and Local Government
A major surprise of the renewal debate was the House Gov-
ernment Operations Committee's adoption-by a one vote
margin-of a proposal to tie Revenue Sharing funds to the
"modernization" of state and local government.290 The so-
called Rosenthal amendment differed from earlier proposals
which sought to achieve reform either by making recipients
(usually states) draw up modernization plans in order to re-
ceive any Revenue Sharing funds or by offering additional
funds to recipients who did. The proposed new section 120
would have required each state to submit an annual report to
the ORS outlining any steps it had taken to "modernize" state
and local governmental institutions and practices. Beyond fil-
ing the report, however, states were not required to do any
modernizing at all. The amendment "establishes as a goal"
the preparation and development of "master plans" and
"timetables" for reform.291 The items which these plans might
contain amounted to a sweeping laundry list of proposals for
state and local governmental change: for example, reduction
of special districts; "adequate" home rule powers; revised
state aid formulas; metropolitan zoning; and encouragement
of metropolitan government. The Committee stressed, how-
ever, that this goal was "not mandatory." The Rosenthal
amendment was eliminated when the full House restored the
original subcommittee bill. The proposal had little broad-
based support and was the target of violent opposition by
Committee members of both parties. They charged it was "a
death-dealing blow to the whole concept of a federal system of
government . . .," which would convert "our States into prov-
inces and our local governments into administrative precincts
290 Id. at 17, 54-56.
291 Id. at 17 (emphasis supplied).
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molded and run by a powerful central government in Wash-
ington. '292
Needless to say, state and local officials opposed the Ro-
senthal amendment strongly. Its defeat helps put the entire
renewal debate in perspective. Many of the same legislators
who opposed it were strong supporters of the new citizen par-
ticipation provisions and other changes. The reason such
congressmen refused to seize the opportunity to use Revenue
Sharing as a lever for even broader changes in sub-national
institutions seems to be that the concept of interventionist
federalism has not yet been stretched to the limits of its logic.
Through the renewal amendments, federal intervention into
local political processes has been extended, but the outcome of
those processes, except discriminatory outcomes, and the basic
structure of sub-national institutions largely are left un-
touched.
b. Subjecting Revenue Sharing to the Annual Appropriations
Process
During the early stages of the renewal debate, liberal critics
lobbied to bring the program under the annual appropriations
process.293 Two distinct arguments could be made in favor of
such a step. First, Revenue Sharing, like most other federal
expenditure programs, should compete on an annual basis for
available funds. Second, this step would provide an additional
legislative control mechanism over grantee observance of
program strings as well as enhancing legislative oversight of
the grantor agency.294 Such proposals garnered little support
in the actual legislative debate. 295
The explanation for the death of these proposals does not
appear to be attributable to congressional hostility to in-
creased federal controls per se. Congress balked at diminish-
ing the predictibility of the Revenue Sharing funds, a result
which would have followed from subjecting them to the ap-
292 Id. at 106, 107 (additional views of Rep. Levitas).
293 H.R. 8329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1975).
294 See, e.g., 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 95-96. (supplemental views of Rep.
Drinan).
295 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S15,713 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1976).
19771
Harvard Journal on Legislation
propriations process. Predictibility is essential if recipients,
especially local governments, are to be able to anticipate and
budget Revenue Sharing funds just as they would their own
source revenues. 296 Maintaining this similarity probably
maximizes local flexibility in allocation of Revenue Sharing
funds since they can be allocated to on-going uses. Removing
the element of predictibility might bias recipients toward
"one-shot" allocations, especially capital projects. 297
c. A Note on the Formula Battle
Although some battles in the continual formula controversy
have centered on the differing values of centralists and decen-
tralists, the principal formula issue in the renewal debate was
where the money was going. The adequacy of funding to com-
munities with large numbers or percentages of service depen-
dent residents was of particular concern to Congress. In the
House, for example, a concerted effort developed to change the
formula by basing distribution of part of the funds on a factor
which measured the severity of poverty within a jurisdic-
tion.298 But all efforts to change the formula failed. Some
congressmen undoubtedly believed the existing formula was
adequate, while others feared that any significant change
would jeopardize ultimate passage of the bill. The inability to
secure any change in the formula represents the biggest set-
back for the liberal critics of Revenue Sharing, who, by and
large, emerged from the renewal debate with a significant re-
cord of achievement.
III. THE AMENDMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE-BEYOND THE NEW
FEDERALISM
As one who believes strongly in the need for local gov-
ernment to be as strong and independent as possible, I can
only watch in sorrow and wonderment as officials of these
communities struggle and strain to tug this Trojan Horse
inside their city gates. - Congressman Jack Brooks on
the renewal amendments.299
296 See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 270, at 9 (testimony of Sen. Brock).
297 Cf. MONITORING REVENUE SHARING, supra note 30, at 204.
298 See 1976 H. REP., supra note 144, at 7-8.
299 Id. at 80, 81 (dissenting views of Rep. Brooks).
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A. The Effect of the Amendments-Mere "Status Quo"?
Given the interest in original Revenue Sharing legislation,
the renewal amendments have attracted surprisingly little
attention. The only major study to date is Revenue Sharing:
The Second Round, by the Brookings Institution. It describes
the renewed Revenue Sharing program as reflecting predom-
inantly the "Ford administration's status quo position. .... -300
Brookings downplays the amendments as simply dealing with
Ctprocess issues .... " 301 This analysis, however, may reflect an
emphasis on the fiscal aspects of Revenue Sharing. Since
Congress did not change the formula, it is only a short step to
conclude that Congress did not change the program. 30 2
But emphasis on what Congress failed (or chose not) to do
should not obscure the significance of the changes which it did
enact. Taken together, the renewal amendments constitute
far more than incremental tinkering with an existing pro-
gram. Congress seized upon the renewal of Revenue Sharing
as an opportunity to exercise substantial leverage over the
processes and programs of state and (primarily) local govern-
ments and placed entities of the federal government in a di-
rect supervisory role over those processes and programs.
For the first time, the Act contains citizen participation
strings; and these provisions cover not only Revenue Sharing
funds, but the recipient's "entire budget" (section 121). Con-
gress increased local flexibility, at least symbolically, through
elimination of the priority categories. At the same time, how-
ever, Congress clarified and strengthened the federal prohibi-
tion against discrimination in the outcomes of state and local
political processes (section 122). Through the complaint
mechanism and citizen suit provision, Congress buttressed the
federal enforcement apparatus in a way which not only ensures
observance of federal strings, but helps redistribute power at
sub-national levels by opening up federal forums to those who
have been excluded from, or simply dissatisfied with, the state
300 SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at 23.
301 Id. at 166.
302 The Brookings study does not go this far, but treats the renewal amendments as
essentially status quo "on the principal issues .. " SECOND ROUND, supra note 8, at
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and local decision-making process (sections 124 and 125). In
sum, the primary responsibility for choosing particular bun-
dles of goods and services remains with state and local units.
But the national government will intervene to ensure that
these 38,000 sub-national units adhere to standards of fairness
in distributing the funds and that the results do not run afoul of
national values.
The dominant force in the renewal debate was the congres-
sional centralists who have always been ambivalent about the
desirability and wisdom of any Revenue Sharing program. On
one hand, they have viewed the concept as ceding too much al-
locational authority to sub-national units. On the other hand,
however, they have always recognized the enormous inter-
ventionist potential of any such program. The renewal
amendments may prelude changes far beyond the reach of
Congress' regulatory power over state and local governments.
Richard Nathan has stated that "despite the overall aim of
New Federalism to avoid intervention by the federal govern-
ment in the structure of state and local government, there is
growing evidence that in the next decade the great issue of
American domestic government will be precisely this ques-
tion.' 30 3 The renewal amendments stop short of the "new
Structuralism" which Nathan describes, at least if one defines
structure as pertaining to "organizational arrangements." 30 4
But the amendments do reach deeply into the practices and
procedures of state and local governments. Since changes in
the Revenue Sharing. statute may be precursors of changes in
other grant programs, perhaps one can redefine Nathan's
ttgreat issue" as follows: given the fact that state and local de-
pendency on federal grants is liable to be greatest in the case
of the growing volume of multi-purpose grants which become
similar to own-source revenues, to what extent will the fed-
eral government utilize this relatively new form of leverage to
secure broad changes in state and local processes, structures
and allocational decisions?
303 Nathan, supra note 5, at 128.
304 Id.
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B. The Amendments as Precedent-Implications for the Future?
One element which supports the conclusion that the
Revenue Sharing amendments may be a model for future fed-
eral intervention into the affairs of state and local govern-
ments is the ever increasing dependence of these governments
on federal aid. A recent New York Times survey of 20 cities
reported that public officials, economists, and labor and busi-
ness leaders "could not foresee a time when the economy in
the aging cities would improve to such an extent that they
would not have to depend on Federal subsidies to pay the
salaries of municipal workers. '30 5 Detroit's budget director
went so far as to say, "'There is no way we could maintain our
services without these Federal programs."30 6 For all state and
local units the magnitude of federal grants as a percent of own
source revenues has increased steadily from 15.8 percent in
Fiscal Year 1961 to over 35 percent in Fiscal Year 1977.307
The second element which will determine whether Con-
gress will seek to exercise the leverage which this increasing
dependency brings with it is how well the "new" Revenue
Sharing program is operating. For example, whether citizen
participation in budgetary decisions has increased and
whether it has any real influence upon such decisions will be
key issues not only in the next renewal debate, but also in the
structuring of other grant programs.
Current public policy issues provide more specific illus-
trations. Consider the possible implementation of the "disper-
sal approach" to the urban problem in the administration
of the Community Development Block Grant program. H.U.D.,
for example, may make awards of funds to suburban jurisdic-
tions, contingent upon their willingness to use other funds,
and their regulatory powers to assume a "fair share" of the
metropolitan housing burden. As another example, Con-
gress might enact a program of "Special Revenue Sharing" for
education, which conditioned a state's receipt of funds upon its
305 N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1977, at 66, col. 1.
306 Id.
307 A Fiscal Note, 3 Intergovernmental Perspective No. 2, at 20 (1977).
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adoption of an equalization program of aid to local school dis-
tricts. In the case of Revenue Sharing itself, Congress could
adopt the Brookings proposal to condition state eligibility on
establishment of "some form of independent or quasi-
independent state advisory commission on intergovernmental
relations or commission on local governmelt."308 In each case,
the federal intervention bears less directly on the expenditure
of the particular grant funds than on the underlying practice
and procedure of state and local government.
Interventionist federalism, as discussed in this article and
found in the renewal amendments, is different from both the
New Federalism and the categorical system advocated by
some of the New Federalism's critics. The logic of the New
Federalism' dictates that the national government take the
practices and procedures of state and local units more or less
as it finds them. Interventionist federalism rests on the
legitimacy of action by the national government to change
those practices and procedures. A categorical grant system
mandates the outcomes of those procedures, e.g., "X" amount
of spending for "'Y" form of education. The interventionist ap-
proach leaves outcome choices in state and local hands, al-
though it will forbid nationally undesirable outcomes. The re-
newal amendments illustrate this point nicely. Far from en-
gaging in "hardening of the categories," Congress removed the
priority categories and the anti-matching provision. At the
same time, it strengthened the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Revenue Sharing program.
National policymakers are not likely to preach "interven-
tionist federalism" because it smacks too much of a powerful
central government which would convert "our States into
provinces and our local governments into administrative pre-
cincts .... "But they are very likely to practice it as they move
beyond the New Federalism. Moreover, the Supreme Court
seems likely to take a benign attitude towards interventionist
uses of the grant device to secure changes in state and local
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governments which Congress could not mandate directly.30 9
Where Congress draws the line will determine whether the
New Federalism's successor is, in fact, federalism at all.
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